


## A BRIEF PRESENTATION OF MY BOOK



*Title:* THE PARADOXICAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF OTHERNESS (In Bulgarian: „Парадоксалната феноменология на другостта”)

*Sort:* Monograph

*Author:* Ivaylo Lazarov

*Year of Publishing:* 2010

*Publisher:* Varna Free University Publishers

*Category:* Philosophy, Phenomenology, the Postmodern Humanities

*Language:* Bulgarian

*Cover:* Paper-backed

*Number of Pages:* 298

*Size:* 70/100/16

*ISBN:* 978-954-715-473-5

*Key Word:* Paradox, Otherness, The Other, Phenomenology, Discourse on Aporia, Existential Experience, Hermeneutics of yourself, Ontology of the Body

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## THE PARADOXICAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF OTHERNESS

(The Other: social image, existential experience, ontological structure)

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### *Summary*

'The Other' is one of the important problems of contemporary philosophizing on which it has always been hard to write. The philosophical status of otherness in postmodernity is based on conceptual figures and categories that escape easy explanation, such as 'identity', 'difference', 'the Other', 'paradox', 'aporia', 'experience', 'phenomenology' etc. Their theoretical rethinking and redefining has been and will be an attestation for the capacities of every professional philosopher. Their universalizing significance, for its part, will increasingly more often impose their overcoverage in postmodern human studies and their use for the purposes of a multitude of sciences related to philosophy.

The Western continental tradition, in the most recent times, has proposed numerous, including phenomenological, works on this theme, mostly in the area of the contemporary philosophical literature in the French and German languages. But, of course, an ultimately radicalizing philosophical study, directed at otherness, is topical not so much *because of* the tradition but *despite* it. The need to raise such a theme is imposed by the fact that, **on the side of the approaches of a phenomenological vision and progressively radicalizing beyond its confines, otherness each time anew rediscovers the *self* of the writer and, moreover, primarily within the deed itself of writing.** We are hardly aware to what degree writing, which is a deed of designating the same, would not be able to designate the same if it were not itself a *sign* (an *other*) that designates. All too often, in the study of the Other, the analytically oriented philosophy<sup>1</sup> has paid little attention to the fact that, in reality, our interaction with the Other is not in the ordinary modality of creatures, cycles and processes, but that we, primordially coerced by virtue of the very intent for worldness (i.e. recognizing ourselves in a sign, by mere contingency), become forced to utter (respectively, to write) 'possible interactions'. That is, if we, as a re-orientation and in spite of any traditions of consolation, undertake the decisiveness for a discourse that would represent an unrepeatably-untimely attempt at radical reflection on *the event of discourse* in general, we will notice how far and how, in our interpreting uttering (writing), we projectively displace first of all ourselves through the *sign* – the first Other – of ourselves, by which the world 'around us' is constituted in its meaning, with its diverse 'multiplicities'. Granted this, it will become clear that, in the first place, it is not merely 'the other-neighbour' in his quality of 'human' but even the 'world' itself is an encountered sign, and thus a sign of something other. In mathematics, physics and analytic philosophy, probably all possible references are to the world, but there one forgets or ignores the fact that the world itself is an effect of the writing event of

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<sup>1</sup> The chief characteristic of analytical philosophy and the empirically oriented worldviews that are still dominating historically the study of otherness is the so-called 'forgetting of the event', i.e. the sneaking of concreteness in through the point of the place rather than in the condition of every appropriateness (or being-in-place) in general. In this manner, the events becomes itself a place, and, therefore, the privileging begins of possible experience by abstraction from the mechanisms of its always untimely happening in the actualization of its writing down.

immanentization (on the side of the actual writer). Thus the world is not the only possible reference but only a reference of the possible. The actuality of the writing encounter of the world runs ahead of the world: the world is a sign that – only in thinking it industriously and hence industrially – refers us to something outside of us that can also happen not to exist. The fictitious worldness itself somehow (also in the clear case of writing interval on the side of the event of writing) discovers the world/the other as one of the possible (valid) signs for itself, which in practice represents a super-miracle... or, more soothingly speaking, an *aporia*.

Getting us landed in this aporetic modality, the problem of otherness categorically states its philosophical complexity and importance. In its turn, in the deployment of its theoretical history, it could be deepeningly graduated. This refers primarily to the researching nuancing of the problem. Thus e.g. according to Tzvetan Todorov in his book *The Conquest of America. The Question of the Other*, '[to] account for the differences that exist in actuality, we must distinguish among at least three axes, on which we can locate the problematics of otherness. First of all, there is a value judgment (an axiological level): the other is good or bad, I love or do not love him, or, as was more likely to be said at the time, he is my equal or my inferior (...). Secondly, there is the action of *rapprochement* or distancing in relation to the other (a praxeological level): I embrace the other's values, I identify myself with him; or else I identify the other with myself, I impose my own image upon him. Between submission to the other and the other's submission, there is also a third term, which is neutrality, or indifference. Thirdly, I know or am ignorant of the other's identity (this would be the epistemic level); of course, there is no absolute here, but an endless gradation between the lower or higher states of knowledge.'

Probably because of the deliberately anthropological commitments of his study, Todorov implies but does not specially analyse precisely the deepest in the problem of otherness – its paradoxical appearing. This concerns the pressing need to undertake a study of the Other through the so-called *paradox of limit correlation* (see footnote 5 in the Introduction), i.e. through the possible-impossible 'fourth level' (to use the context of T. Todorov). This level is a philosophical self-collocation in a classical 'double-bind situation' (*Derrida*): it is *phenomenological* because it is forced to retain immanent meaning contents on the side of the subject; but it is also *ontological* because these do not satisfy the subject. Paradoxically, it is in the distancing interval of essential non-belonging between the I and the Other that their mutual belonging becomes possible *ex post* in the constitutive layers of the mind. In experience, they come out to be cosubstantial as pre-fundamentally different. The paradox is precisely that otherness is pre-posed but it is thought. It is pre-given but it also belongs to us reflexively.

The above considerations turn this monograph into a specifically original philosophical attempt at realizing the necessary radical step in relation to the paradigm of epochal talking – on the existence, on the subject – as far as this paradigm comes out paradoxically contested in its own inherence by the presence of primarily the sign (the other) of itself, as well as in general – as far as it is doomed constitutively to differ, being self-naming. Noticing the paradoxicality of the situation around the Other in the aspect so raised should not evoke any longer any special aspirations towards otherness as *one of the possible* philosophical problems. Otherness turns into a problem not of paying respect or disrespect, not of identification or distinction, but of an impossible coordination, which always has already provoked us into a correlation that surpasses our feeling of constancy, belonging and self-importance. This is why the Other is not simply a limiting possibility of me as an identically being I; it has the nature of limit precisely as the impossible me, the impossible 'neighbour', the impossibly same *actual event* of my possible realizations, comings into being, samenesses. The other is always the happening of *the same* Other – and, as the same, he is nothing more than a case. This is what makes the Other not a possible but an *actual*

*experience*, not a phenomenological constituent but an ontological event<sup>2</sup>. That is, the paradox is noticed phenomenologically but its roots are ontological since they concern the status of the final existence and thus the absolute immanentization is contested of the uni-inherent on the side of the limits of its happening. (At this pre-reflexive layer, which is pure otherness, being is still inviolate from the interference of consciousness – and providing meanings comes only afterwards.)

The study argues for the following thesis: **the Other is the very experience of my retaining of myself. This is an impossible experience of me as the same, an experience through the limit and from otherness, an experience of the other as the very possibility of the same, an aporia, i.e. an experience *ex impossibile*.** The radicality of the implications of this thesis arise from my deep conviction as a researcher: it is only when a philosophical theme contains in its title and thesis the concept of ‘paradox’ and posits an *aim* through it, that it implies a claim for radical problematicity, as far it is obliged to require *the critical procedure*, including in its attempt to face its own criteriological possessions<sup>3</sup>.

Generally, there are two research tasks that are implicitly woven into the content of the monograph: 1) **the Other must ‘be discovered’**<sup>4</sup> (*T. Todorov*); 2) **the Other must be circum-interrogated**<sup>5</sup>. The result of their successful fulfillment is the proposed in-depth theoretical-critical tracing of the most important constitutive and regulative effects of the projectively-describing examination of otherness (on the plane of phenomenology and by the degree of radicalization within the frame of its own history).

As to the choice of form of presentation, this monographic text offers a much more *narrative* than *argumentative* philosophizing, but such an approach is not arbitrary. The choice of a narrative type of discursivity in this study is a wholly deliberate procedure, as far as it is the phenomenologicality and its concurring effects that impose this. The Other – as the absolutely other (and incomparable to anything other) – is, before all, a *dialectical* event of the sedimentation to the Other rather than just one of the possibility *analytically* to present and define the Other (as was already stressed, nothing proper of the Other is not within possible experience!). When put phenomenologically, any theme of the paradoxical status of otherness must not be hasty with postulations and conclusions in taking for granted unchecked critically presumptions like e.g. the trivial one that within the possible experience there necessarily exists ‘someone other’ who I am supposed, at any cost, to convince argumentatively about my theses. This text does contain argumentation but it is implicitly aware that this argumentation only becomes possible in the pinpointing statement of the world on the side of the subject-of-stating.

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<sup>2</sup> The Other is the *event* of reflexive sedimentation into meaning – it itself being taken as distinct from everything else. This is why the ‘flows of meaning’ in the mind, in reality, do not retain the Other but only encounter him: in designating the Other, reducing him to *this same* Other, he, precisely in his quality of ‘other’, escapes the essence/meaning that we ascribe to him.

<sup>3</sup> Critical reflection aims primarily at the *criteria* that constitute the possible experience as such, recognizing them as paradoxically un-self-sufficient precisely on the impossibly-aporetic plane of the philosophically permanent ‘critique of critique’. The latter indicates, in the final account, the impossibility to aim all-encompassingly at the Other analytically, in lagging-behind, in commensuring, i.e. wholly and solely in the annals of possible experience. The paradoxicality of the thematic experiment consists in the fact that ‘every possible other’ is pinpointed through the form of ‘same’ but this takes place uniquely, projectively, as the first thing that happens by chance. From the perspective of this paradox, which is only noticed phenomenologically, it becomes clear that the actual experiential synthesis makes the world happen thematically and thetically rather than the other way around.

<sup>4</sup> There is the primordial danger of the Other in his quality of stranger, but also, together with that, the danger of not genuinely discovering the Other – the danger, primarily, of not clearly outlining the horizon of our own pre-determination as from the Other (this last danger, actually, comes out to be more fatal than the predetermination itself).

<sup>5</sup> Experience is precisely ‘science of the sensory’ and phenomenology is the proper understanding of experience as transcendental empiricism; in this sense, experience is the incessant report (as from the subject) of contested presence. According to G. Deleuze, ‘**on the contrary, transcendental** [unlike any other – I. L.] **empiricism is the only way to avoid tracing the transcendental from the outlines of the empirical**’ (emphasis mine).

In principle, argumentation and its accompanying effects on cognition abstract away the discrete actuality of the utterance in favour of its convertibility of content. But they do not seem to notice that in the world there is nothing actual before the act of ‘uttering’ or ‘stating’ (see footnote 15 in the Introduction), nor is there metaphysically such a thing as ‘conversation’ and ‘convincing’ before the event of alterization on the side of the subject-of-understanding. For its part, **narrativity as a type of expression is the way to delineate the world as an actual event of immanentization**. Primordially, a thing-of-the-world has no other way of appearing than immanently, and therefore, also in the narrative of pinpointing statement on the side of the one who *actually* states the world. Therefore, no understanding on the side of ‘someone other’ precedes the existential fact of being-understanding (of anything) in the order of immanentization. The personae of the conversation are always already secondarily pinpointed. The measure with regard to such a pinpointing is not metaphysical but purely technical. According to it, reason only has rights but no obligations; all of its relative ensuing presumptions are not able to surpass toe respective language game of explainability, imposed circumstantially and not obliging anyone by anything beyond the pure case of its presenting positing. It is not the conversation that reveals the Other but the Other, as the very discursive event of omniloquy, is revealed in conversing, in which there is no personal identity that would not be constitutive to that event. Phenomenologically, responsibility is primarily responsibility precisely due to the factor of immanentization (Me) and not because ‘anyone’ supposedly would not understand me (as if he, and any other persona pinpointed in a statement, is there at all anyhow else than precisely in the possibility of stating predication, i.e. as fictively understanding). The watchful remaining within the (ever-actualizing the world) event of immanentization is, in the final account, the primordial theoretical basis for the departure of the author’s own reasoning within this discussion. In this manner, the message of this book does not permit itself to pre-resolve rationally there where one must resolve intensively, and each time on the plane of immanentization. It is only in the expression of the narrative (see footnote 17 in the Introduction) that one uses fully and without residue the thrust of the paradoxical co-location of the Other through the Me that is extending the world, the Me as a factor of world-bearing and light-bringing.

In view of the above considerations, the undertaken narrativity of the discourse in the monograph, in every moment of the exposition, pursues the goal of expressing the event of the text – in this way, the textual expression is conveying maximally authentically this event as an aporetic situation without taking the reader away from it even for a moment. The Other is always upcoming; therefore in the proposed text the Other, before being studied cognitively on the side of the annals of externalization (which are effects of the same), is, in the first place, explored, traced, followed dialectically, purely, bearing in mind the limit of immanence and with a continuous ontological clarity as to the transcendence of the intent of presence. It is only in this manner that the gaze must analytically grasp those present – in the opposite case, the researcher would risk losing himself among them.

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**Chapter One** of the monograph discusses the phenomenological dimensions of the paradoxical situation, in the same time outlining, under a generalizing angle, the problem beginnings of otherness. The analysis, ascending from the abstract to the concrete, defines the theoretical accents of its contents in the first five sections of the exposition.

The first section extracts the thematic problem and the need for its exploration, attempting to notice the paradox against the background of an impending departure from the trivialities in the ordinary (banal) representations of otherness that haunt our everyday consciousness. The situation around otherness, whenever the reflecting I interferes

(interrelating mostly with himself and only thus with the things around himself), is far from being so simple and 'transparently' self-understood as we have carelessly become used to perceiving it. It comes out paradoxical because it is an *experience from limits*, and such experience contains tensions from differences and requires a different kind of responsibility, as our finding ourselves in the aporia is, not usual to our everyday perceptions. According to Derrida, the aporia is an impossible contradiction, something unimaginably more than the antinomy that could be rationally resolvable 'into something third'. By the analysis on the limit, the paradox becomes radicalizingly recognized in the extension to the other by the sense of the same, and the I is paradoxically the Other in an absolutely same, invariable point of departure. Again in relation to the limit, the ontological status is analysed of difference and difference in the spirit of Baudrillard and Deleuze and their link to the constitutive deduction of otherness. The priority is stressed of difference before sameness and similarity which are always already contingently pinpointed and must be retained 'each time' responsibly, non-modally, synthetically, aporetically, in the synchysis of actualization which is not only knowledge and which immanentizes and is always coming.

With regard to the delineated aporetic principles of philosophizing and to the further methodological need to avoid the trivial figures of pseudo-dialectics, the second section makes an attempt at the precision of the theoretical distinction of aporetics from (pseudo)dialectics. The danger of the latter consists in underestimating the problem of 'otherness' or in the fear of it, as far as the history of modern Western philosophy provides typical attempts (Hegel, Leibnitz, and earlier Nicolas of Cusa) of placing the Other under the logo of the Same. The conclusion is that in all three thinkers, dialectics does not really move outside the Same; it remains a privileged discourse of genera and not of names. The aim of the exposition in this section is to protect the study from a mistake that is usual for most studies of this kind, namely the mistake of taking the deliberately frivolous path, avoiding to deep the problematicity, of a non-projective interrogation of otherness, which path, due to the 'imperialism of the same' (*Levinas*) that reconciles differences, would not take the challenge of the aporia of otherness. The summary conclusion of the achieved delineates the qualitative difference between the levels of 'problem of discourse' and 'discourse as a problem' with regard to the phenomenology of otherness. The conclusion reads: paradoxically, dialectic comes to its proper place only when it sets itself apart from its message, i.e. when it recognizes itself from the limit of discourse – then, it is metaphysics; it is metaphysics not as a discourse but as *metaphysics itself* – as the absolute division of body and meaning. Thus Discourse becomes a Problem – and in its right to be (always returning as untimely) *problematic*. Following the suggestions of the concept, we understand that the revelation of philosophy is no longer 'the good sense' or the 'common sense' but paradox. Paradox becomes the pathos, or passion, of philosophy. Classical dialectics is replaced by aporetics (the living, 'metaphysical' dialectics of the pulsating heterogeneity of the same).

The third section concentrates on the research method of the monograph – the bases of selection, range, codification. My discussion here is guided by the conviction that the method must locate me into the primordial perimeter of philosophical situation. It must provide me not only with the problem but also with the procedure of problematisation in its pure form. Problem and method must be one – this turns the study into a *theme* (*Husserl*). Therefore I need a method guided by *the primordial limit of allowance* of the one to any other (this limit is *I*); a method that would not lose sight of the very inherence of the system that allows for self-revelation. My argumentation in this vein states explicitly: every methodological errancy that affirms presence before inherence (inherence is the 'itself' of the essence, as difference with what is befriended/contested) misses precisely the contesting as a basis for study, falling into the trap of the totalisation of the possible, overcovering the legend of the transparent otherness classed under the Unisubstantial. A method that does not encounter the other,

encounters nothing. In such a perspective, I see the *expression of paradox through method* and as a methodological strategy of *phenomenal synthesis*: the otherness of the other is not the same of the other as other; it is *constitutively* correcting (on the side of the I) as a possibility of access and spreading of the same, but to another, including the mine as pre-funded in another. In the tendentially undertaken radicality of the method, not only paradox comes forth but also – because of its co-eventual movement toward additional radicalization – the *questionableness* of the method. The inevitable in this undertaking is that the questionableness obviously comes after the properly historical unfolding of the method rather than before it. This categorically proves: despite the contradictions and criticisms upon which it stumbles, the method is the basis of the Work and a Road to noticing and dismantling the paradox. Thus, the method is necessary<sup>6</sup>.

The fourth section analyses the phenomenological constituents of otherness and their paradoxicality. The progressive analytical-deductive tracing of the constitution of intuition reveals the constitutive experience as an experience from the otherness on the basis of the primary reflective unit as is the figure of ‘synthetic apperception’, and in unfolding further the achievements of a radicalizing onto-phenomenological reflection through the paradoxes of *space, time, and the intersubjective medium*. Thus one reaches the approaches of the ontological structure *The Other*, which, however, is only secured theoretically without being expressly defined in this section. The overall order of the exposition in the section in fact reveals the structural scheme and the stages of synthetic deduction of *intent* as the pure expression of absolute otherness. Intent does not belong to the world; it is *the other itself* of what appears. Intent is the pressure of being in its strife for worldliness. Worldliness is extended in the compression of intent; it posits it as a way of personal experience, through the existence. Intent reflects will and knowledge but they themselves are a complete negation of the activity of intent: will and knowledge are a drive, a kind of diffusion with the worldly, which intent has already gathered.

The fifth section successively reveals the parametrics of otherness in the perspective of its typological varieties and by degree of abstraction. The exposition offers an interesting dialectics of the other in its modes from *merely non-I* – through *incommensurability* – *strangeness* – up to *absolute otherness*. The proposed gradual analysis of the parametrics contains a number of original contributions. It is precisely in such a successively justifying context (and, as it became clear, after a solid preliminary preparation demonstrated in the previous sections) that the study finally permits itself the express definition of the category of the Other as the concept that carries the most complex and syncretic meaning burden in the book. *The Other* is a meeting with what is absolutely other and it is only thus that what is absolutely other is The Other. The actual Other is on the side of the phenomenon as non-belonging; he is not the economic side of the phenomenon – he is the other itself of the appearing sign. The Other is that of the belonging which is contested, it is a Work of taking-over and experience of the aporia. Solidly précised in the exposition, my approach to the Other in the further course of the monograph unveils the problematic appearance of the latter mostly in the following three constitutive aspects: 1) the Other is the first that appears as the appearing itself (i.e. a pure ontos, an inaccessible being in itself); 2) the Other is an ontological structure of visibility/circumspection (i.e. a complex/intensive existential experience); 3) the Other is the co-eventuality with others (i.e. a social image). Each of these

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<sup>6</sup> Phenomenology is the first method that has turned into philosophy itself (*Heidegger*) **as far as, self-funding in what is most concretely self-describing** (the pure subject, the phenomenon), has ‘discovered’ **and finally touched the Other**, the sign, and through it, also the *pre-phenomenal basis* for concretization, and has done so precisely at the limit moment of designation. I.e. by its very emergence it is doomed to be other; in putting forward the last instance, the pure I, it has already named the first Other, cracking through the immanent in the non-transparent punctuation of its own having/being-there.

aspects is solidly justified but it also creates the field and possibility of its further theoretical securing in the course of the next two chapters.

**Chapter Two** of the monograph ('The I as the other of oneself') aims at deducing the analytics of sameness on the side of its own limit, departing from identity and putting the latter to the procedures of reflective contesting. This is all motivated by the need to outline the absolute possessions of phenomenological immanentisation and to establish the possible field of the meeting between the inherent and the non-inherent through the limit of the world (the subject). Thus the exposition is an attempt to theoretically reveal the *internal effects* of the paradoxical appearing of otherness. The chapter consists of three sections that successively deduce the stages of the analytic in question and in the perspective of the self-contestation of the method (of phenomenology) and of its flowing into a *hermeneutic of self* and, in the final account, also of reaching the pure instance of otherness – the *ontology of the body* as the very/the proper/the primordial expression of philosophy.

The first section deals with identity as a problem and the paradoxicality of the situation of its retaining. Its exposition problematises the identity 'right at the threshold' of otherness. The theoretical procedure here pursues the radicalization of identity with regard to grasping its genealogy. Most generally, the question that interests me in this section is put thus: how possible is my simultaneous being in the world and, figuratively speaking, 'within myself'? How could I, identifying myself in the other of the world, remain myself just as *me*, rather than as another that would define me as from the side of the world? This is where I see the paradox of the I-ness. The section begins by a critical-reflective discussion, in the spirit of phenomenology, of five theses of key importance to the being of identity: 1) *Identity is the phenomenon of subjectivity in the primordial mode of being posited through a subject, but it is not a human being before everything else.* 2) *Identity is the other name of the paradox of time.* 3) *Identity is power that is worried about itself.* 4) *Identity is what is retained discursively in the postscript of the event.* 5) *Identity is the limit correlation in oneself to the question 'who?'.* These theses subordinate the aspects of importance of the problem identity, as far as they reveal the genesis of every possible identity not from samenesses, and as far as they unmask every possible identity to the making of its own fictitiousness. This lays the basis for a new theory of *narrative identity* which self-posites generally identity and epochal samenesses in the field of the pure playful eventness.

Then, the exposition takes the first step before its appearing 'in memory of method', as far as through the being of pinpointing (the I) and in the aspects of the appearing of the subject as essence (*idem*) and selfness (*ipse*) a doubt is cast on the general legitimacy of the methodical procedures of phenomenology in pinpointing the first happening (the subject) without, however, canceling the necessity for transcendental reduction (otherwise, the identity as a problem could not have been even noticed). Thus the exposition finds: identity comes out transcendently guaranteed only as an effect of substituting correlation with a body that is to be named in its quality of 'first object' in the extending order of bodies but not identified through a figure of self-sameness, i.e. as a privileged identity with itself. A transcendental standpoint is only needed to notice that language, as the happening itself in the areal of presence, in fact orders, sub-ordinates, in de-scribing an order. The Pre-scription (on the side of order) is always in the postscript of the linguistic event – thus the order may be traced as if it had also happened before its being traced. Language defines a field of identifications; everything before language is not, since, even if it were there, it could not have been stated. From this, at least two things follow: 1) Not preceding the speaking, 'we can be nothing without *playing* at being it' (*Sartre*); 2) Identity – understood narratively (in the spirit of Ricoeur) – can be called, by linguistic convention, identity of the *personage*. Thus contingency changes into fate and every eventness from the legendary plane of the spoken is in fact constituted narratively. In such a paradigm, the conception falls of 'the being of



necessity' as attached to the epoch and supporting the epoch in the all-pervading project of some 'contemporaneity' or 'human history'.

Trying out radicalizingly the capacities of the method, it is here that phenomenology in its analysis necessarily cedes before a *hermeneutics of oneself* (see footnote 66 of Chapter Two) on the side of the playful event of interpreting oneself (and in conformity with the need, in the pure case of being, to identify yourself through a body of 'self') and of being a part of a multitude, most probably a fictitious one, where nothing may exist but many things may be valid. The hermeneutics of oneself in the state of contested identity witnesses, in the final account, the selfness (*ipse*) – simultaneously in its distinction from *sameness (idem)* and in its dialectical relation with *otherness*. The dialectical relation between selfness and otherness appears as *more fundamental* (whose attestation still betrays the ontological stake of self-identification). Along with that, this relation is also more fundamental than the 'selfness-sameness' dichotomy, the latter being marked by the ontologically dividing dimension of being (in its quality of potency/act). In both cases it is the selfness that comes out as existentially decisive: it is a figure prompting toward the unyielding of identity; in the same time, it is the primordial field of collision where I, in myself alone, paradoxically meet the un-inherently strange (to me) of recognizing as another. Identity is a drama of (mis-)recognition: this is the *risk* of bearing it and the *difficulty* of retaining it, just because it doesn't suit us.

Generally, throughout Chapter Two of the monographic exposition, I pay attention to the problem I got from the apt title of Ricoeur's book – *oneself as another* – but with a difference not in essence but as the same which is another. However, the two sections (1. and 2.) have each their specific emphasis: in the first one, I scrutinize '*oneself*', i.e. the identity of the I, and most of all for the sake of the need for the I to recognize himself; in the next section (2.) I emphasize on '*as another*', deducing the relation *as from the side of the other*, focusing on the properly paradoxical moments of subjectivity.

In the second section, I specially analyse the constitutive consequences for the I on the side of such challengers of identity as the procedure of pinpointing on the side of the Other as an event – *positing, occupying, and coming* – and in the context of their enumerated accompanying effects. In such a perspective, the subject is identified narratively-procedurally as: 1) positing in a time; 2) estrangement in a body (flesh); 3) sedimentation of *self* in the field of possible. The aim is to specify the burdening principles of a being of the possible which, in the passive synthesis, takes itself as not a 'proper/own self', i.e. with all existential consequences of a primordial estrangement from oneself to which, *post factum* and in the possible experience, we are forced to become accustomed and even attached<sup>7</sup>. In this way, the analysis of the above narrative contradiction consistently proceeds into the subsection on the status of the ontological structure of the *stranger*.

What is interesting here is the discussion on the problem of what the mystery of *cogito* represents for a disclosed me. Here is what it represents: the *me* of 'I think' contains in its essence a receptivity of intuition in relation to which the I is already other. The speaking (i.e. the actual) I is the Other .whence it should be concluded that the I of the philosophies of the subject is *atopos*, with no assured place in the discourse' (Ricoeur). The I that has been spoken out is the Stranger: this is the I of the *cogito*, the present I that has fallen out of the event of the place – at the *place* of his sedimentation into time. He Stranger is the one lost in the same, the one who circumspects the same sacredly closest to the Other: in the final account, it is on him that the burden falls of the event of the Other, he is the par excellence the

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<sup>7</sup> In calling the I the primordial basis of identity, I, in theoretical principle, mean the importance of the evoked *ecart from everything else* (in the special mode of 'this-is-mine') most of all to the constitution of intuition. But such a positing, besides securing identity, in the same time evokes an amazement about the status of 'mine-ness'. This status is constitutive but it has not been called forth by the I or generally by anything that is *mine*, primordially self-multiplying itself. I do not have any positive knowledge or even a passing memory of this calling forth; moreover, in a radical sense of 'examining the mine', it is foreign to me, it burdens me by a presence I have not wished for.

one that the Other meets, *encounters*. And this same I, in a losing ecart from the coming one, is always already late (for the meeting, because it sediments it in the pre-suspension of oneself). The responded self is a stranger to himself: 1) *stranger because of the response* – because he is recognized through *this* (a body, a thing) which is not himself; 2) *stranger because of remaining this* (the same finite *this one*) among a multitude of others of the kind who do not recognize him in themselves nor does he fully recognize in them what he is. The stranger is the one who is foreign to himself in the quality of a *self* reflected by an Other.

Thus, the Stranger is an ontological structure of the cracked I, revealing the doubly estranging, an assuming-sedimenting subsistence of a present being in the aporetic tension of the speaking event. The structure of the Stranger, localizing the will of correlating, inevitably points to the pre-foundation of the aporia – the sigh that the hermeneutic of self is not able to reduce because of the self-contesting possessions of the passively synthesized Me. This pre-founding sign is the *body (corpus)*; the body: 1) as that which predetermines ontologically any phenomenology of otherness, and 2) as bringing in the discovery of the Stranger. The body – this time as itself a *stranger of meaning* and a transcendental modulator of presence...

The third section scrutinizes the aporia of the body. In it, the study makes the necessary *next* step of dismantling the problem – the step from the hermeneutics of self to decisive ontology. Situating me preceded ‘me’: hermeneutics, revealing me, is just a step of revealing the Other. This is so inasmuch as the hermeneutics of self, at best, unmasks the Stranger and proposes a paradoxical ontology of flesh through the manifestation of the subject – as a mine-ness of the worldly performance before every possible fulfillment. The question, however, is that the phenomenal is the pivot of the subjective and not the other way around. The *sui generis* is a possible ability to turn conversely the phenomenal situation but this ability is not realizable. Flesh still remains the antipode of the same, but again in the modality of the meaningfully/designatedly opposite – the flesh of the Stranger as attracting-repulsing in the imperative of mine-ness. The appearance of me in a modus of self (flesh), rather than of self as the other of ‘me’, is the event *itself* of sedimentation: through this ‘self-ness’ of the event, the me comes out to be the happening of the Other as a transcendental range of coming-hither. Thus it becomes clear that the hermeneutics of self is primordially preceded not by the attempt to identify me but by the Other in the sedimentation of me and before any possibility of identifications. The other of ‘me’ as self is always the postscript of the event of the Other that posits the very subject as a necessity of occupying. The Other is primarily a body as a *corpus* of positing, then I would call *body* the encounteredness of the Other in a event of positing. This encounteredness is an exposition through a body. The body is the Other as far as it exposes (*Nancy*). Flesh, for its part, is primarily not body because it is recognized through the gestalt of the *body-corpus*: flesh is the body as paradoxically possible, i.e. meaningful. Flesh is already the other of ‘me’ in my quality as subjective occupying. Be it the body as an organ or a body-of-meaning, thinking otherness through the *body-corpus* is in the very foundation of the thinking-of-this (every *this*) which is **primordially paradoxical**, and as such, irreconcilable as thinking with a limit on the side of what is thought – the body/other.

The aporia of the body lies in the ontological impossibility of the coincidence into one of the body-as-positing (*der Koerper*) and the body-as-meaning, i.e. the lived body (*der Leib*). The gesture of the lived body on the side of a principally other and unattestable phenomenally mode of omen (pre-designation) is the attempt itself for a philosophy of the body. The aporia is precisely of that predestination of heading to provide a head to a pre-given weight which is, in essence, its pre-phenomenal negation. The aporia of the body is a classical form of paradox, the very primordially of the paradox of otherness. The paradox lies in the substantial incompleteness of the body – it has being as an organ of the subject ontos but without the need of being headed – the head is in the very semantic negation of the body as a

method of the organ. The body is a prohibition of the cephalic<sup>8</sup> before any phenomenal experience. Along with that, the body is a meaning (here lies its primordial paradox!), it is a product under the form of meaning and, besides the semantic body, none other appears in the world. Positing the telos as a horizon of visibility on the side of the body is the beginning of every philosophy (of the body). Every philosophy comes down to the body because in its course, philosophy seeks a body, the ability to postulate the super-value of the body.

**Chapter Three** ('The Other as transcendence') is established on a solid fundament: the meticulous theoretical analysis of the aporia of the body reveals the secondariness and conditionality of every 'constitution of the possible' as an attempt at a congruent answer to the Meaning precisely on the side of the *event of the body*, as far as the order of worldness follows as a resigning shadow the endless modulations and articulations of the body as the Other of (every possible) goal-positing. The exposition is oriented to fulfilling the following three research tasks: 1) To demonstrate how far the Other cannot be preceded in any way whatsoever by the event of sedimentation, i.e. to notice the Other in his beyondness of being ever absolutely coming – irreducible/unsedimentable and 'he himself' actually sedimenting particulars that are setting apart. 2) In connection to the previous, to reveal the genesis (the transcendent origin) of the sign of the Other: *a*) in its impossible invention/finding up to authentic presence; *b*) as an immediate possibility of engaging recognition (of a subject) in this same (other) sign of ecart from everything else – and most of all in the lagging effects of *social imagery*. 3) To analyze in an existentially-phenomenological perspective the paradoxical nature of the so-called mechanisms of 'access' to otherness. So oriented, the exposition focuses predominantly on the *external plane* of appearing of otherness (in the modality of every possible specific), tracing its accompanying effects and mechanisms of subject coordination and commensuring.

The chapter's first section argues that it is not the case that the Other is an invention of intersubjectivity but that it is intersubjectivity that is an attempt of the subject at securing selfness, crystallizing to generality, respectively to the sedimenting effects of community and the social roles in which the subject, following an intersubjective command, is estranged. In this sense my conclusion is important that despite the complexity of identification through social event, respectively everyday habitualities expressing the domination and the eidetism of personless otherness, the I, figuratively speaking, constitutively/formatively dissolves the system of social interferences and does not belong to it in any way. The Other still remains transcendent to the system of personally identifying pinpointings (respectively, to intersubjectivity) precisely since there is no eternally same necessity for the I to self-identify in the world. These radical conclusions ensue from the suitably corroborated view that the I is simultaneously: 1) the event of the Other as transcendence (intent for presence) which sediments the absent to recognizing presence, and 2) the virtual form that surrounds the overlapping effects of that sedimentation-into-reality of the being, in sedimenting the illusion of totality and univocity of the latter. This emphasizes the view that even in the quality of transcendental modulator of the present (other) ones, the subject is intended beyond itself in a primordial relation with something transcendent again, although the latter appearing in the postscript of the event as a sign-of-presence. In this perspective, in the intuition that represents a homogeneous and compact horizon of the event of speaking that sediments into meaning and order, the Other will be constituted as a predetermining condition of otherness primarily of myself. According to this paradigmatic position, by the way, the regularities are decided of externalization on the social plane. Their tracing in the text is done at two levels – *constitutively* (in the aspect of appresentation/association) and *regulatively* (in the aspect of the 'lifeworld').

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<sup>8</sup> The terms *cephalic* and *acephalic*, conceptualizing the aporetic situation of the body, mean respectively 'with a head (conscious of meaning)' and 'preceding the head (headless, encountering the meaning)'.

The subsection discussing the ontological figure of the Desire is vital to the understanding of the transcendence of the absolute otherness (the intent), but on the side of the logos/the signs also then when the subject reflects aporetically in the intent for presence in the modus of bodies and signs. The study departs from a thesis of Levinas: the absolute transcendence must be created as something that cannot be integrated. In such a radically onto-phenomenological sense, the analysis comes to the conclusion that Desire does not coincide with unsatisfied need; it is beyond satisfaction and dissatisfaction. It is filled by the relation to the Other, or the idea of Infinity. The paradoxicality of Desire is precisely in the wisdom-loving wishing to obtain yourself beyond death, by neglecting/death-of-yourself; this is why the Desire for yourself as someone else, hermeneutically sifted and condensed in aporetic experience, is practically *immortalization*. The *eroticism* of Desire pursues precisely a transcendent address: the Desire comes from the 'form of the formless', incongruent in relation to the body – it comes about because of judgment (the meaning body) which primordially *could* and *must* mean its sign, that is, the Other (the body, the pure ontos). It comes from the fate to judge, wrapped in/permeated by/permeating the lust for judging and the sorrow to be judged. The body is a mysterious vehicle, it attracts by desiring fatefully, sacrally, since its expression through meaning (worldliness) is a negation of the complete expression. It is the body that is desired, and mostly as *naked* – insofar as the nudity of the body (the desired-unreached complete expression in being) is the ultimate goal.

The desire contains the very openness of the expression of narratives – in the sphere of closure (absence) of yourself in the presence of signs (of otherness), you are in fact doomed to discovering yourself. The paradox of otherness shows through precisely in this state of human being, striving for absence in the desire for complete presence. Here we discover 'the tragedy of being, the tragedy of Narcissus and Echo' (*Atanas Igov*). The tragedy lies in the primordial connectedness of un-inherences – in fact, in the very expression of our own transcendence, in the finitude that needs borrowings of the strange in order to be itself, that needs an *expression of what is being* in order to be being. If we would like to point out/discover anywhere along the meaning/lived body a kind of 'zone' of the immediately possible, respectively a *zone* tragically *containing in one* the same (on the side of expression) and the differing (on the side of That which is discerned)... generally, a zone that comes out to be the very proper of presence in accordance to the un-inherent contestedness of the myth of the present one – then this 'zone' is no doubt the Face. 'The face – a state of e-strangement, of displaced causes and substituted goals, the tragedy of the very connectedness of the One to the Other, an essential e-strangement' (*Igov*). The exposition reaches the conclusion: the Face, the *icon* is first of all the assumed absolute Otherness actually and transcendently (from without and at once) – by the Face, every possible economy of what is being is hinted at, preserved, authorized, and perspectively deduced only from the Face on. My *actual* face – and this is precisely the aporia of contested presence! – is *the Face of the Other*, sedimenting to my 'ownmost' I. This strangely presented face subsists revealingly, of course, in the impossibly achievable epiphany of the *col-location* as sedimented to an "understanding/gathering-'here' and not, as Levinas thinks, on an equal standing with the other (be he a next door man, a relative, friend or any type of 'neighbour') on the side of the impossibly achievable epiphany of 'his own' face. There is indeed the danger of succumbing to the illusion of 'the neighbour before us' in his quality of 'absolutely other', misled by the being analogies of similarity and likeness. In such a sense, the present conclusions of this book make us to be alert.

The second section of the chapter focuses on the so-called mechanisms of access to otherness. It contains in fact the proper denouement of the study, as far as it grasps existentially-phenomenologically the aspects of the experience of the happening of the Other in his coming-hither and their corresponding, subsequent to the affectation as from the Other,

mechanisms of responsibility and *philosophical fulfillment* (on the side of the subject). The study reaches important and interesting conclusions with regard to the collision of the subject with his own Other-locality within the horizon of principal immanentization – and also then when the Transcendence is only touched but never properly reached, although it is constructed, i.e. is the responsible work of a subject. Subordinationally and in close link to one another, the following subsections are deduced that base their analyses on typical situations of touching otherness and subsistence in the happening of the Other:

- ‘The paradoxical experience of *possessing*’ (2.1.) defines possessing as a type of being destined for an Other in the predominantly extensive attempt to produce essence from the assimilation of the other. Two types of possessing are distinguished (I the spirit of G. Marcel) – possessing-having and possessing-implication.

- ‘The paradoxical experience of the *meeting*’ (2.2.) defines the meeting as an ‘experience of the past of otherness’, insofar as it is knowledge (as a finding in a situation of passive synthesis) comes from the meeting – being a narrative of a sinful possession of ‘me’ in the coercion of individuation. When the meeting is *neighbourdom*, it seems to describe best the strategies of mastering otherness as a radical attitude. *Touching* is the second type of meeting – it is a reaching that does not reach. It is in the very essence of experience – touching is experience as far as experience is primarily a trying/questioning groping/feeling and it expresses a cognitive deficiency, an erring ‘before the gates of otherness’. The *clash* is a non-bearing the consequences of the meeting. It is recognizable in the aspect of hurting or of direct conflict. *Conflict*, in its turn, is the ‘drama of the clash’: the irreconcilability with the Other, the impossibility of a further reducing sharing, and in the philosophical case, the meeting and hurting from the absolutely other in the mode of making-whole of an inherence directed to its own authenticity – this all generates conflict.

- ‘The paradoxical experience of *penetration*’ (2.3.) presents the logic of reasoning that inevitably leads to the conclusion: despite the apparent helplessness of the subject before pre-phenomenal presences-at-hand, to the phenomenal pressure from without one must respond by pressure, too. According to this presumption, which is not merely a passive reflection but also an actual creative philosophical fulfillment, penetration comes out as not merely touching – it is re-pulsing in the friction of a return that is partial and – quite paradoxically – never staying ‘at the same place’ and ‘simply the same’; this is so because in penetration, every partial return is already within the challenge of a new assuming. That is why penetration is focusing, concentration, but also a transcending expansion outward (and to the Other) through the existential of the place, that gatheringly contains the decision of non-remaining and, moreover, of penetrating invasion into the other precisely as a paradoxical way to stand for yourself. The penetration to all-pervading all-pervasion is a rising up from a long-contained humility<sup>9</sup>. *Influence* as a variety of penetration is an invisibly-permeating penetration while the *puncture* is mostly crudely sensory but, in the more general case, a penetration by deliberate force that can be interested in but also remain indifferent as to how it is accepted. Along with its many characteristics, enumerated in the corresponding order, influence must be summarized mostly as a socially presenting penetratedness by the Other in the pressure/finding (that sediments him) for the explainability of the world through the configurative of ‘transcendental designated’. The puncture, in its turn, is innovatively interpreted in two important aspects: 1) on the one hand, puncturing is a *col-location* (and, properly, locating) of a body in the layer of the familiar. Thus through the Other in the lagging modus of being-present – and as the first meaningful body – I contril the familiar, I control meanings. Having oneself as the *same* (this same body) punctures (penetrates) differing – it is the puncturing distinction itself. The Body-Other punctures, piercing through

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<sup>9</sup> Compare to the biblical: ‘For whoever exalts himself will be humbled, and whoever humbles himself will be exalted’ (Matthew 23:12).

the layer of the familiar. Thus the Other comes out made whole by himself in the col-locability of 'Me', constituting 'the others'. 2) On the other hand, the puncture is also a *breakthrough* – an attempt at a violent exiting – and, this time, as from Me (the meaningful!) through the door (vagina?<sup>10</sup>) from which I have entered. In the context so defined, the exposition (again innovatively!) recognizes the puncture as a crucifixion of the horizontal and the vertical in the paradigmatic modus (the privileging point) of the existence. The puncture is an ecstasy of shortage that finds itself in the prelude of an actual achievement. The puncture is not cross-worshipping, subserviently expecting (religious) but is of-cross, a violent self-sacrifice (philosophical)<sup>11</sup>. Therefore such a puncturing event is a primordially *philosophical fulfillment* (*Ipsa philosophia Christus*), insofar as philosophy is a reflectively fulfilling orgy of the spirit with the body – it, in being-punctured in the body, fills the whole (with a) body of meaning.

- 'Union: from possible to actual experience – love, worship' (2.4.) categorically raises the questions of the secondariness of localization and the lagging invention/finding of oneself in a place and time of subsistence. The hidden (attracting to an achieving merger into union) power of death is not the typical power of the known, since it expresses the very *indifference* regarding the dividing identifications to essences of the subsisting/being ones. In it, only *post factum*, and already in essence, in the context of Levinas we can see this otherness (of precisely the powerful<sup>12</sup> desiring) in the absolutely primary *erotic* relation – a relation that is impossible to express in powers and which we even must not express this way if we do not want to distort the meaning of the situation. According to Levinas, the eroticism of attracting unification comes with the invention itself of positing; thus he seems to allude at the out-of-place-ness of a completely contingently encountered division with regard to the *un-sedimentable unity* (actuality) of the lighting-through. This is why eroticism does precede the worldness and therefore sends every possible localization beyond itself. In this sense, truth is essentially of the eros, it is a creative, liberatingly-transforming effect of an experience, the result of a groping/feel-ing (in its being influenced by the Other) touching of the 'meaningful body of the Other'. Truth actually results erotically, out of *love*, as far as love is the other name of aporetic experience: in an ultimately ontological context, it is recognized as a sacrificially eroticizing, ex-pressing and thus actualizing, truthfully embodying experience. There is the extremely strange *paradox of absence* in love: in the words of Levinas, 'what one presents as failure of communication in love precisely constitutes the positivity of the relationship' this absence of the other is precisely its presence as other'. With regard to this paradox, the amorous attraction cones out to be first of all an *experience*<sup>13</sup> (con-temporizingly deepening through a topos of absolute meeting) of violent (and thus deepening) uni-fication of two dividednesses into the range of importance that is forced to be of sign. This is how the erotic finding-oneself in the attraction of the Other is essentially a thrust to encompass the other in the recognition of present (Me). Since we stop at the Other, then we lovingly/condemningly return the Other through ourselves, necessarily expanding to Him

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<sup>10</sup> Jacques Derrida in 'On the Name' ['Sauf le Nom'] and Eli Syarova (*The problem of chora in the philosophy of religion*) view the meaning of religion in the philosophical aspect as a kind of 'return to the womb'.

<sup>11</sup> 'How are we to think initiation', E. Syarova asks, 'as a "return to the womb" – a return that is essentially a new heading, *without the ordeal of the Cross* [italics mine – I. L.]? Without that ordeal, or without the experience of the limit off the limitlessness of becoming, there would be a negative infinity, a regress into *indefinitum*.'

<sup>12</sup> Is not 'power' the morbidly attracting into *unity* happening in the magic of *lust* on the side of the relative of the being/the essence/the entity that extendingly posit goals and refer to an absolute fulfillment of the transcendence?

<sup>13</sup> Such an experience is the very transcendental contesting of the empirical: nothing proper to love is not from the empirics it borrows. The empirical borrowing is in fact only a sedimentation of the love event. It is the latter, in its reality, that calls for unity, caresses us into phenomenological fulfillment. The tracing of the said phenomenological fulfillment this side of its intended fullness is a *s-ex-ual* act that transcendently oversteps the worldness. The impossibly looking unity on the side of the being of sameness (the finite subject) is the actual (un)differentiating merger on the side of the immense irresistibility of the Other. I.e. albeit apparently seeming potentially impossible, such a union is in practice act-ual precisely in the momentarily actualizing non-articularity (in-finity) and absolute Other-dimensionality of the action.

through individuation (Me). This is where, by the way the paradoxical essence lies of the deepest union. Union is, in the final account, the experience of the negating self-subsistence, that is, of intensification. According to the individuating principle/individuation (*Deleuze*), through which love is to be looked at from now on, the whole of the manifested is *one* – up to the end of desiring exaltation. The experience of love, whenever it is phenomenology, i.e. an experience of union in an ultimately individuating love for wisdom, turns into a specific kind of love that can be called worship. *Worship* is a wisdom-loving experience of a unifying living of oneself as another by a sacrificial overcoming of the extensifying pressure for being mediated through another. In this perspective, also when it reaches its impossible limit, the exaltation of worship turns in the opposite direction – to *itself*. Precisely in synergically directing the whole of its energy not outward but to itself as the first and the only encountered other (the Other), ex-altation turns into an implosion of the actual happening of the being outside itself<sup>14</sup>. It is by means of this tucking-back, implosively-puncturing insertion of Me into *myself* through the ultimately possible (actual) point of realizing union, that a chance is open to decipher the mystery of sexual magnetism. This is a mystery that reveals ‘the ownmost mine’, as far as, on the side of the implacable limit of me and with a reverse pressure to the intent of presence, the critically-reflective blocking takes place of the self-reproducing voices of the imitator, bringing in its turn the actually desired<sup>15</sup> – the surpassing of these voices, the going beyond the sphere of the *logos* (*G. Angelov*). The abandon itself of the involving force of desire, the submerging into the pure otherness, essentially eliminates the problem<sup>16</sup>. Thus the haze seems to leave the ‘intricate’ character of the aporia, and *death* (as the very other even of parable) is for the first time seen not on the side of the field of apparitions. In such a spirit – and also as a *sui generis* apotheotic attempt to reach the denouement of the exposition, this final subsection ends in noticing death as a syntagmatic event, as far as in the light of the aporia assumed by unifying fulfillment, the mask is taken down of every possible linguistic pinpointing of it, and thus the syntagm of ‘my death’ comes out to be a fertile beginning of the waking-future securing of the ‘being of responsibility’ on the primordial plane of the undying, ‘ever-returning’ intensification. When it is there, the latter is able to make use of death, respectively to ride ‘in dignity’ the coming-hither event of the Other... and thus self-sacrificingly to survive – not *in time* and not with regard to the *eternal place* of itself, since space and time, and hence finitude/mortality, follow as a shadow the pure happening of the event of pinpointing, they are not eternal, they do not presuppose being burdened under the scepter of a totality. For the totality not only contains us (in its un-reflected modus of multiplicity) but we also carry it immanently, as far as we posit it, and for this reason we also have the right to abrogate it as a type (of imagery). And to rise before ourselves with the authentic face of the ‘self’ who puncturingly (and through a body) is collocated with someone Other – and therefore *does not properly have* either his own place to be attached to or his own time to drag him along.

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<sup>14</sup> Such a state, in an ex-istentialist context, I called tentatively, in the text of the section, *s-ex* – a ‘sexually’ intensifying act of the actually unifying creative achievement. The *syn-thesis of differentiation* on the side of individuation (the ‘Syn’/Son), when the latter is actualizingly self-overcoming effectively, I designate philosophically as ‘sexual act’, i.e. *making s-ex* to oneself precisely in the specifying meaning of ex-istential self-ex-tasy.

<sup>15</sup> The great paradox in fact is that the actual realization of the desired is there only when the desire is stopped, when non-desiring becomes desired.

<sup>16</sup> This is splendidly grasped by Jacques Derrida in *Aporias*: ‘where we are exposed, absolutely without protection, without problem, and without prosthesis, without possible substitution, singularly exposed in our absolute and absolutely naked uniqueness, that is to say, disarmed, delivered to the other, incapable even of sheltering ourselves behind what could still protect the interiority of a secret. There, in sum, in this place of aporia, *there is no longer any problem*. Not that, alas or fortunately, the solutions have been given, but **because one could no longer even find a problem** [emphasis mine – I. L.] that would constitute itself and that one would keep in front of oneself, as a presentable object or project, as a protective representative or a prosthetic substitute, as some kind of border still to cross or behind which to protect oneself.’

Finally, the **Conclusion** repeats in a synthetic form the important conclusions of the exposition. It develops the interesting idea of the proper other-locality of writing and of the resigning effects of the de-scribing event. In principle, the postscripts (as indeed are all scripts purely and simply!) are always in memory of the Other – and then the question is what actually theories and conceptual schemes resolve (by means of the same, i. e. in the modus of sedimented otherness), since otherness comes in one way or another – although not as something familiar (re-ality)... and in such a case, the actuality itself of the Other reveals the ‘solutions’ as nothing more than a quite un-necessary tracing/following of the signs in the illusion/plane of the same. But what durable and essential tracing there might be at all, since the same paradoxically is the other precisely in its quality of a trace? The trace of otherness as seemingly the essence/sameness of otherness is actually-meaninglessly otherness itself. And then does not the valuability of circum-scription still prove that otherness is a value without a price? If so, then this book has done its job – its conclusions have no price indeed since there is nothing (other) to compare them with, except in pinpointing, in the lagging modus of a presence that indicates really nothing.