

# ON THE EXISTENTIAL AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL IDEA OF TIME

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## *Abstract*

The paper gradually unfolds the author's unconventional outlook on the genealogical stems of the idea of time. It is known that the postmodern philosophy in principle is due to drop out time as a metaphysical factor for predetermining the concept of time and the wide variety of time definitions as well. In focus is the vision of time "simultaneously" phenomenological and existential (in their single unity), which is first to mean that the phenomenon "time" should be looked upon as to the very verge of unfolding a certain radicalizing philosophical reduction, unveiling *the untimeliness* of every single query of time in general. This presupposes for the very unveiling of the phenomenon to disclose from now on a horizon of epochality, rather than implicitly to infer time as an essential factor of natural happening of those being present within the horizon of a certain epoch or tradition. Such an approach, although built on genealogical analysis, goes fundamentally counter to every intentional analyticity, that is likely to grant the time all those empirical rights, it is authentically not entitled to, except only (just) in the postfactum of the reflection. This is exactly what makes up the main thesis, running throughout the paper submitted for publication: there is no time at all beyond the context constituting a world within the horizon of "temporality", which – in the capacity of *an existential* (following Heidegger's terminology) – times up in all manner of pre-destination only in the articulated possibility for those existing to be designated. Time is thus set out to be, above all, "the assumed burden" of the responsibility to designate and to bind over and over again the notion of that being present to the importance of the designations. The theses in view, as well as the evidence, verifying it, are developed gradually with regard to the thematic content and logical rigorousness.

*Key words:* time, transcendentalism, phenomenology, epochè, constitution, existentia, existential (by Heidegger), epochality, temporality.

I would formulate the thesis of the exposition put forward in the following way: **Time is a well-marked distinctive feature of being as a phenomenon, as a faculty of perceiving. It is through time that the phenomenal is correlated i.e. moulded into a particular pattern.** *Time*, in other words, is a characteristic of orderly arrangement of those present-in-their-current-form-of-being, in correlation with accidentally privileged point of positioning<sup>1</sup> and in accordance with a certain content goal-expedience of the communication.

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<sup>1</sup> It is exactly through granting a privilege to the encountered point of identity, under consideration, that the idea of the subject could be brought out methodically. Reproducing phenomenologically the identity in question brings about the effects of *bringing-up-to-time*.

Theoretical incapacitation of most trivial, nonphenomenological (resp. metaphysical) concepts of time lies in their attempt to define<sup>2</sup> and explain time as immanent of some illusionary omnipresence of time – that is, to subordinate the idea of time to the notion of its substantiality. In such a paradigm of time instilled are supernatural content predications – so as it to be inferred as an utterly indispensable (metaphysical) guarantee of every possible mode of being, which, in fact, it is not. Personally, I think that a more correct methodological setting as to the problem of “time” has the task of probing into the *genealogy*<sup>3</sup> of the idea of time, in other words: to account for the addressee of the accepted challenge something altogether to be sanctified/described/designated in the form of a world-under-projection, resp. a fundamental concept. Such a genealogy would not transfer metaphysical responsibilities to the concept; conversely, it would make an attempt to detect and point out in particular the respective responsible agent of metaphysical pre-determining and conceptual goal-directedness, i.e. **it would not grant a privilege to content determinants of every possible worldliness prior to indicating critically and reflectively (that is to say formally and transcendentally) the way it comes to be possible.** In such a really critical<sup>4</sup> paradigm, even at the very verge of unfolding a similar genealogic case what is noticed is, that there is no way to separate the “omnipresence” of Time from every possible narrative presupposing it. On the whole, it is the subject of the worldliness (of whatsoever it is) that encounters the world in a given narrative, the world does not self-encounter itself – put it in another way, the world is not capable of self-expressing itself (self-responding, resp. self-sanctifying) unless accompanied by an agent of responsibility – the latter being the subject, in particular, who, however, is not present empirically in the articulation (of the world), being the one who does the narrating. It is exactly when the world is perceived as nothing else but the consequence of a (narrative) event<sup>5</sup> being articulated it becomes clear, that time cannot go beyond the horizon of its own sign and concept designation, meaning that, a horizon of immanentisation “for ever” and *out toward* the time is unattainable. That is how – and in accordance with the genealogical assumptions of phenomenology<sup>6</sup> – the critique of the

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<sup>2</sup> Transcendentalism, as a type of antimetaphysics, is a criterion out toward *finito* (the very edge of the intuition, pre-determined in its own wholeness and oneness as a pure intuition of Everything) – and then we should ask if we ever need a *de-finitia* at all and for what purpose, viz. vicious mix-ture of criteria and in most cases–commix-ture of folly.

<sup>3</sup> Philosophy as a deed and endeavour should stand up for its right to be viewed as genealogy, i.e. to affirm in the locus of the actual, not the possible one, in interpretative, not metaphysical universum. „...genealogy is an endeavour for a certain solution to become problematic again.” (Vatsov 2003: 225)

<sup>4</sup> A distinctive feature of the *critique*, in the way it finds its expression in Kant’s philosophy, is viewing the retributive judgement out toward the form of the appearance of judgement faculty in general, which is to mean – transcendentally and logically strong disagreement as regards the illusionary absoluteness of every possible factual (empirical) content of that coming-into-sight.

<sup>5</sup> The event in philosophy is an event of the very chance happening of the *world as a whole* out of nothingness. The event in science, however, is simply a description of empirical dependants via a proposition. Philosophy point of view takes into account the distinction between *actual* and *possible* experience. It is the latter in particular that relates to the articulations of the science and day-to-day life as well. The events in the possible experience are hypostases about the states of the existing entities, not consistent marking off the immanent actual occurrence of the world via a boundary of the possible (subject). **Actual in philosophy stands for the very act of articulating (primary-designation) of possibilities.** It is exactly this upcoming act that we call an *event* and it does not result out of nothingness – as I have already pointed out, it simply occurs in the way speaking itself does.

<sup>6</sup> Reflection, when it is *transcendental* and *phenomenological*, is immediate (*spur-of-the-moment*) and presupposes no measurements or parameters ‘by themselves’, the being of which is not a result of the interpretatively constitutive setting of the consciousness. This is all a consequence of a procedure conducted in a phenomenological epochè, which is exactly the one that brackets the objective status of both the epochè and the time itself, placing them in co-subordination to the constitutive plays of the consciousness. **The awakens of the reflection, thus, is satiated with time to such an extent so as not to let time self-transcend itself. Hence, we immanentize time responsibly and with a force, in inverse proportion to “its natural course”**

empirical cognition holds: time is a notion of an object as regards its potential conditions and in the concreteness of the articulation itself, rather than time, which necessarily and substantially embraces everything present. The epochality of the discourse is not pre-determined by time, it is almost accidentally and in the actuality of the subject-object intervening space recognizes time as a constituent of every possible positioning in the content projection of the discourse. The category “epochality”, thus, needs re-defining: **epochality is significance of time only when transcendently (i.e. in line with the exigent genealogy of every possible sense bestowment) assumed is the responsibility by a subject for sharing the significance and social validity of a given discursive content.** Never prior to that... in other words never for the benefit of history, that is, for the benefit of irrelative, objective Time.

Russian philosopher *Nicolai Berdyaev*, basing his conclusions on some contributory issues as to the eschatological methodology of *St. Aurelius Augustine*'s times, in his historiosophistic book *The Meaning of History* expounds, albeit in a harsh manner, on those tragic for the human being-awareness points of time, grounded on a single exceptionally objectivistic and all together positivistically metaphysical notion of time. In principle (and with due subtle nuances) Berdyaev has good reason to set apart *cosmic* and *historical* from *existential* time<sup>7</sup>, a similar grading, however, reveals the corresponding grades of concretization and beneficence of experiencing time. The tragedy of the cosmic and historical time as types of time, according to Berdyaev, is precisely in the assumed enforcement for human beings to interpret their presence in the world under the burden of self-fractured alienation and yielding to objectivities, order and “laws” of the natural and social being, breaking their willpower and boldness for a change consistent with their unconditional desire for a free *modus vivendi* expression. “The time of our global reality – Berdyaev acknowledges, – the time of our global *eon* is a time of tearing apart; it is an evil time, comprising in itself malign, deadly inception, it is not an integrated whole, but disjointed into past, present and future.” (Berdyaev 1994: 77) It seems as if, in this fatal severing, slowly and stealthily creeps our helplessness to grasp and become aware of the inexorable paradox of time, that begets this bewilderment and the impossibility to cast off the assumed weights and burden out towards the world of objects: “The historical process within time is a constantly tragic and anguished fight between these lacerated parts of time –the future and the past. This severance is so exceptional and dreadful, that **in the long run it converts time in an apparition of a kind** (bold mine – I.L.), because if we pro-analyze the three parts of time, the points of time in the past, present and future, it is possible for us to fall in despair: all the three points turn out to be apparitional, because there is no past, no present and no future” (Ibid.). Existentially “shattering” is every subtle nuance, Berdyaev imparts on the awareness of historical epochality of time. It turns out, that the sense of historical time, in spite of the horizon of humanistic concreteness as regards the dogmatic abstract notion of time, it brings in, it, nevertheless, fails to overcome the subjectively-personal alienation in the course of historical regularities: “The time of our global reality seems to bear life; in fact, it bears death, because, bringing life into existence, it precipitates the past into the abyss of non-being, because every future has to become past, has to come under the sway of this engulfing flow of the future, and gone is that reality of genuine future, that would hold the entire being in its complete wholeness, where the genuine time would overcome the evil time, where the severance would be brought to an end and the time in its wholeness would be an eternal present or an eternal day; because it is exactly the time of the

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**not letting it immanentize us.** Let us recall Vassil Levski's dilemma “*Time is inside us and we are inside time; if we do not overturn it, it overturns us!*”. This, however, is Bulgaria's own contribution to phenomenology long before its „historical” appearance as a philosophical science.

<sup>7</sup>See also more specifically his book *Self-knowledge* .

present-day, when everything is being done, with no past or future, nothing but a genuine present, that would be the genuine time” (**Ibid:** 78-9).

In the light of the thesis and objectives stated above, one of the primary tasks of this brief presentation is to decode in a critical-and-analytical plan the *genesis* (the origin of meaning) of the cosmic and historical notion of time in the context of the classifying typology proposed by Berdyaev. The two quoted types of notional concepts follow the underlying identical starting parameters of the metaphysics of time-comprehension they imply: 1) that time is in its essence a universal (pan-optical) characteristics, disclosing the succession and direction of flow of all the processes in the world; 2) that time is immanently interwoven in a single basic and totally dominating physique of the objects precisely as a property of their objectiveness, in other words it possesses an outlook at its disposal, modal independence and direction of flow, fundamentally irrelative as regards the interpreting consciousness of the existant discreet observer. Thus, from a purely analytical point of view, a given trivializing dominantly *physical picture of the world* is identified in every individual case solely on the basis of the following implicit for every current physical description metaphysical assumptions:

*1. There exists a necessary substance of the world, which is the nature (the matter).*

How are we supposed, therefore, to react to this universally recognized axiom from the point of view of the already proclaimed *genealogical* critical method? In principle via the concept of “substance” (although being implied, i.e. not always fully and clearly expressed, but readily inferred from the verbal expressions of physics and a number of other co-subordinated to it empirical sciences)... quite a lot of conventionalities have already slowly and stealthily crawled inside, such as: **a)** that we have essence of “everything”, which is far from being compulsory; **b)** that the world is present by necessity, yet it simply articulates itself if necessary and the content of each articulation is solely a possibility open to the world; and nothing by origin compels us towards one and only picture of the world. Therefore, the expression “*nature*”-*of-the being* (substance) is only one of all the possible language-designating assumptions about the world as a whole, whose semantics starts off “weighing” not until in the postfactum of the assumption in point, nor prior to that; the world could be a complete whole with no stipulated in space and time unity by nature – e.g. if it is considered as a pure phenomenon in the assumptions of phenomenology. Construed transcendently there is not a single instant, in which a substance with the presented empirical characteristic features to precede **the chance happening** of the world in general, i.e. the presence of something in general. These characteristic features, resp. defining what exactly a physical substance is – allow me to state this for the third time! – are just a single possibility towards the world, and we are fully aware of the fact that, being-in-possibility is totally unlikely to be substantial.

*2. There exists a priori an objective order, incl. of a fundamentally historical one, which is not dependent upon its articulation and the world, therefore, is obligatorily self-organized prior to the experience and independently of the act of interaction with whatever subject-reason.*

*3. Physical objects are “in themselves” fraught with meaning, not an object of the constructive mental activity of cognition. The latter is all but secondary in reflecting them.*

Contrary to such a dogmatic belief in supernaturalness of the meaning, a given critical and reflective paradigm of the pure reason perceives the impossibility of creating altogether a

meaningful orderly arrangement outside the interpretative capacity of cognition (*Kant*). In agreement with such an approach inconceivable is the existence of a metaphysical abyss between the cognition and objectively-empirical arrangement *a priori*. Conversely, the world (incl. its pertinent physical objects) presents itself in orderliness and wholeness due to the interpretative activity of the cognition itself; world and cognitive knowledge turn out to be co-existent by condition, because there is not a single instance, exemplifying the world's capability of becoming sanctified by itself and beyond the possible presuppositions of cognition.

4. *Material objects are self-constructing by themselves via a rest mass, which does not affect fundamentally their movement in the intuition unity of the consciousness. Each movement, thus, comes just after the moment of abstracting away from and beyond the "rest mass" in point.*

Ignored, however, is the fact, that, the „rest mass” in question is the very premise of movement and there is no way of it being arbitrary abstracted solely and exclusively for the purposes of movement, resp. space and time. More critical point at issue, nevertheless, is the failure to acknowledge the very chance of its occurrence – namely, that its designation in conceptual and dimensional plan is possible only in accordance with and for the purposes of physical interpretation (i.e. ensuring the play of “every possible empirical, resp. physical explanation of the world”), these purposes, though, will always be absolutely accidental and circumstantial, i.e. bound to nothing out of the scope of perceived interpretation. The latter is likely to grant itself a privilege only derivatively, not originally, in other words, its substantiality develops from nowhere.

All in all, trying to defy the traditional beliefs and at the same time to provide an answer in the close-up of the phenomenological critique as to what time is like, our analysis faces the necessitation to pro-demonstrate visually *the very authenticity* and namely *untimely foreseeability*<sup>8</sup> of a full-philosophical critique of metaphysics, incl. that of time.

The first fundamental point of the above-mentioned critique ought to bring forward the principal critical thesis, running throughout the explications of Kant's critique of pure reason and Husserl's phenomenology, namely, that for convenience and restriction of the sphere of the senses, the cognition is capable of devising the nature by itself (resp. the cosmic time) and the society as well (resp. the historical time), loading them with supernatural characteristics, they on their own account are incapable of possessing. What is invalid here in the case of this dogmatic burdening is the fact that, considering everything the cognition labels it all a “nature” and transforms it into a criterion for the truth “in itself”, which, to put it mildly, utterly astounds the inquiring genealogist-researcher. In practice the God of Modernity – is actually the Nature, the way *Spinoza* declares it. In that case the empirical natural- science and especially – physics, is a kind of a “theology of the contemporary epoch”<sup>9</sup> and nowadays it hands down in its own idiosyncratic way the best possible traditions of the non-critical mediaeval praise to God as a Creator and Absolute Spirit.

The second fundamental point of this anti-metaphysical critique refers to the question of sensing the way in which philosophy in its capacity of phenomenology stands – if it

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<sup>8</sup> The philosophical issue about the nature and status of time is not that of “within time”, it is always *untimely*, a question not only going beyond “this epoch”, but also raised in accordance with a modality, exceeding that of time.

<sup>9</sup> Because if metaphysics were not present as a type of explanatory schematism, there would have been no need of physics as a kind of interpretation regarding the effects of delay in the event of worldly all-articulatedness.

“makes up its mind” – a good deal away from the empirical science<sup>10</sup>. *Martin Heidegger* is one of the original specifiers of a similar critical approach, yet – disguising to a great extent the transcendental approach of Kant’s tradition – his method could, with a pinch of conditionality, be termed not transcendental, but *existential phenomenology*<sup>11</sup>. In his book *Being and Time*, attempting to define the meaning of *Dasein* as an exemplary being-here-existential and the most concrete possible to-be, taking an entirely philosophical look at and from the point of view of a single analytic of *Dasein*, Heidegger comes to the conclusion, that **“scientific research is not the only manner one and is not the closest possible way of being in the world, fallen into the circle of Dasein (bold mine – I.L.)”** (Heidegger 2005: 17, §3). This exemplary existential occurs as itself in the circle of possessions, which can from now on be granted some authority in a universalistic discourse, that is – only now they can be endowed with the power of scientific world outlook. Put it differently, as I have already pointed out, first it should be emphasized, that a certain scientific apprehension of the world, happens on its own account, and to this effect the science as a phenomenon of carrying-the-world-within and a way of describing the being-in-the-world, incl. even predetermining of time, it itself is just a mere happenstance, a vehicle for providing explanations, and ergo, easily ruling out the possibility of not doing it<sup>12</sup>... Upon which, as it could be inferred, being-out-there (*Dasein*) would have chosen, within its full rights, a different possibility of clarifying the being-in-the-world or, if it makes up its mind, would simply remain silent “with the ownmost voice of consciousness”, the way Heidegger put it, as the most authentic voice of the existentia.

In such a way and from the point of view of a certain analytic of *Dasein* acting as the very primordial concreteness of being-in-the-world, that is, in the questionability of its being as a philosophical (not a physical) experience, Heidegger has brought to our attention what

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<sup>10</sup> To accept the material origin is one thing, but altogether different one is implicitly to burden our view of life with “material *primal* origin”. Such a deliberate substantialism, as stated above, is harmful, and leads to self-overrating of the physical and the overall empirically-object-oriented point of view (adopting metaphysical implications, as mentioned earlier) and to unnecessary haughtiness of the scientific descriptive imperative as well. Besides, it is not possible in any way to assert for sure: “I see or I am **indebted** to see the same, as you”. The consensus, put forward, normally puts me under no obligation, especially when I can see, how unnaturally it rules out all my prospects for making a single discovery. Another case in point: the very fact that a certain theory works, and how well it works, does not mean yet, that **a**) works the best possible way for all times and each and every individual; **b**) methodologically, being the most useful, is also at the same time existentially the fittest – on the contrary, commonly encountered is an inversely proportional dependence between both of them! And last but not least, hyperbolization of the material genesis is a kind of paying homage to a contemporary God, because the matter itself is being deified (or the Universe to all of us), resp. the properties of the corpuscularity (adopting the discourse of physics incl. of day-to-day objectives) as a constitutionally fundamental idealization.

<sup>11</sup> “Philosophy – Heidegger reveals – is a universal phenomenological ontology, a derivative of the hermeneutics of **being-out-there** (*Dasein*), which as the Analytic of *existentia* has attached the end of the guiding clue of each philosophical inquiry where it *springs from* and where it *thrusts back*.” (Heidegger 2005: 37-8, §7). Besides: “...for Heidegger to bring up a key phenomenological issue for discussion... means to ascertain how the philosophy is the science of being. This is an act of ascertaining, fundamentally (in my opinion, the use of this word is far-fetched – I.L.) different from Husserl’s transcendental treatment of the phenomenological issues, which, with Husserl, as problems of the transcendental phenomenological knowledge and transcendental *ego* do not establish philosophy as a science of being.” (Turlakov 2003: 109)

<sup>12</sup> Science is a privileged discourse, but in memory of tradition. The question, however, is what happens, if the existentia acts with determination as for the foundations not to be supported by tradition, history and the global time? Indeed, the form of expressing the truth of today’s epoch finds its best appropriateness in the tradition. The science, though, on its own does not mark the dimensions of the sense of problematization, since in its postmodern aspect, a long time ago, it converted itself and its excremental backwash into a problem. The problem in question seen again from a fundamental point of view is already confronting the science in a critical examination, it, from a certain moment onwards, in its very essence has already stopped being in its possession – to counterbalance all sorts of traditions, all kinds of average accents, any time whatsoever...

we should safeguard ourselves against, so as not to find ourselves in the irksome position of the scientific reductionism, with its constant ignorance of its own fundamental principles. The latter implicitly (which have already been emphasized over and over again) adopt axioms from metaphysics. Let me quote a passage from “Being and Time”: “*The first philosophical step: not to tell a narrative* (the way every science does in predetermination – I.L.), i.e. to define a certain entity by way of referring it to another entity, as if a certain being would have the character of a certain possible being-in-the-world” (Ibid: 13-4, §2). On the whole, this is a question, that tries to see through the grounds on which scientific possibilities are legalized, prior to their gaining the right to legislate themselves being “the most precise” and “undisputedly correct” ones, qualities they are trying to ascribe, in general, to e.g. “the science of physics” as being one of the sciences, exploring empirically the dependences of time.

On the basis of such a methodological context, triggered off by Heidegger, the following conclusions should be drawn:

1. **The standing of a particular science is defined upon the extent to which it is capable of settling a crisis in its own concepts/assumptions**<sup>13</sup> (such an attempt in the field of mathematics in the late XIX c. and the beginning of XX c. was made on *Brouwer’s* intuitionism, as opposed, for example, to formalism; attempts at revising traditional mathematics were exemplified in the Continuum hypothesis – *Cantor, Zermelo-Fraenkel*, etc.; partial is also the attempt at advancing a similar methodology in *Einstein’s* special theory of relativity and the ensuing – typically postnonclassical as a descriptive model – quantum mechanics<sup>14</sup>).

2. **There is no need whatsoever to do a certain descriptive task** (incl. the science of “physics” the way it is commonly known), **assigned by a pre-set discipline**, on the contrary: according to Heidegger (see *Ibid*: 29-30, §7), **from the relevant necessities of particular issues and from the requirements imposed by the very “chance happening being” way of exploring the possibility of a potential establishment of a certain discipline**. This is a rule laid down not by any science whatsoever, but by the very existentially-analytical reflection out towards the being-out-there (*Dasein*), set forth by the phenomenology itself, acting as a corrective of any scientific-disciplinary approach, involving us in the intricate universalistic rules and imperatives of disciplinary account.

At this place I would like to contribute two obligatory complements, built upon the follow-ups that have hitherto been drawn. Complement to 1.: The conclusion attests, that the

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<sup>13</sup> See specifically **Heidegger** 2005: 16, §3.

<sup>14</sup> Objections could be raised against my point of view that, for example, photons have no rest mass and at the same time this does not hinder their acceptance as physical objects at all. It’s all true, but it, nonetheless, does not empower them to be substantial objects, metaphysically elusive of the constructive procedure of cognition. It is their running counter to the classical rule of the corpuscular causality, that makes their being a paradox, quantum and, what’s more, it is not obtained in congruence with a particular absolute inertial-navigation system, presupposing the omnipotence of space and time as placeholders of being. Concurrently with this, however, photons phenomenologically constitute spatio-temporal dependencies not “alone by themselves”, but explicitly from the point of view of a supposed discreet observer. Their “objectness”, thus, cannot metaphysically be severed from the observing subject. **They are objects, as long as they are the outcomes of actual interactions, of a clash of differing interpretations**. They are not something self-identical, substantially predetermined in space and time, such as the corpuscular particles of the classical mechanics and popular physics of objects. And – which is the most important: this is how a given phenomenological reflection views the actual state of things, not accounted for by the quantum mechanics itself (QM). I have my doubts as to whether, that the concept “light” in the special theory of relativity (STR) is a phenomenological one, otherwise it would have had its backlash upon the specificity of the concepts “*world*” и “*subject*” as well, an effect that is missing in STR and QM with respect to phenomenology... What is more, there is no explicit concept of “observing subject” even in the contemporary non-classical physics, although its implications in the clock/the instrument.

study has to secure the being-out-there (*Dasein*) as constitutive to every single universal possibility (incl. even that of time), not vice versa, the way the scientific determinism does openly, making nature and natural cycle absolute. Complement to 2.: The subject (as primary-designated in any articulation, since they relate themselves towards the other beings-at-present) should not be disciplined from the very beginning, since it is precisely they that are carrying-the-world-within<sup>15</sup>. Inversely, they should choose the discipline with utmost responsibility and to the best of their believes, inasmuch as it is they who have secured themselves the freedom not to get primary-designated with totalitarian convictions and those methods and paradigms imposed upon themselves.

Contemporary philosophy out of all phenomenological divisions backs particularly on the Kantian tradition in the interpretation of time. What is exceptional and needs to be singled out is, that “for Kant “I think” and the time are one and the same, i.e. “I am” as a pure apperception and time are identical which may be indicated as protoidentity<sup>16</sup>” (Nedelcheva 2003: 25). **Perceived transcendently, reflection is self-observation as regards time and running the risk of setting off from a privileged point of departing.** “Reflection – asserts Tanya Nedelcheva, summing up Kant’s thoughts – is temporality right in the tension, she discloses between “was” and “am”. Perceiving “the I” as being different from its own self, which does not take off its identity, is nothing else but its temporality, thus making reflectivity an inner possibility of “the I” to unveil its authentic being as temporal one.” (Ibid: 27) Assen Ignatov, bringing critically into comparison Kantian and Heideggerian rendering of time points out in the spirit of a typical Kantian terminology: “Kant grasps time a priori, whereas Heidegger conceives it a posteriori” (Ignatov 1999: 255). Hristo Stoev, in his turn, implicitly allowing for such a distinction, thrusts upon the thesis, that by probing into the problematics of “the internal sense”, in particular, Kant comes closer to Heidegger as far as this apprehension goes: “Although Kant proceeds from a mathematical concept of time, although he qualifies it as a source of those synthetic a priori conditions typical of pure mathematics and pure mechanics, with the mere defining it as the form that relates to the *internal* sense, he advances a brand-new directedness of its close examination, matching that of Heidegger” (Stoev 2005: 128). Heidegger, on his part, gives emphasis to the constitutive moment of time as regards the existents, which authenticates through the identity of its own distinctiveness. According to him, “in so far as the inner nature of the endmost subject involves the possibility of their being affected as a given solitariness, the time as a pure self-

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<sup>15</sup>At fault are those representatives of the otherwise postnonclassical quantum mechanics, who keep on paying their toll to the implicit assumption about the invariance over the speed of the photons for every possible inertial frame of reference (e.g. 300 000 km/s). The assumed invariance, thus, violates, of its own accord, the principle of discrete observer frame of reference, because it turns out that, the observer observes only certain features and instances of the superior to him in existence inertial frame of reference and that is under certain idealized conditions, not the world itself as a perceivable oneness and a schematic construct of cognition. The point, however, is that, the constant unit of the speed is hypostasized as a conditionality precisely as towards a subject responsible for the comprehension, i.e. the interpretative consensus of the speed of propagation of physical objects (photons) does not bind us fundamentally and “for ever” to this speed. *The consensus, the hypostasis out towards the cognition* presupposes the speed/the constant and its conditionality, not the other way round, the way uncritical physicists take it to be. A science, which does not falsify its own grounds, has no right whatsoever to enjoy the privilege of being “exact” and “the only possible one”, except for narrow educational objectives of those not yet reflecting critically on its foundations. The philosophy, being a critique of the possible experience is, indeed, for individuals far ahead in their way of thinking. Its field of study is “high” to the utmost degree. It is, to cite Hegel, “the very permanency of studying” (“Phenomenology of Spirit”), not purely and simply a discipline, a study.

<sup>16</sup>“The reflection, through which time is manifested as a characteristic feature of the proto-identity – explicates Tanya Nedelcheva – Husserl terms “transcendental self-critique of the very phenomenological knowledge.” (Nedelcheva 2003: 26)

affection constructs the fundamental structure of subjectivity<sup>17</sup>” (Heidegger 1997: 163). As Vassil Penchev states “inasmuch as Heidegger fundamentalizes the factual, it seems even more precise to say: Kant grasps time a priori, whereas Heidegger does it existentially” (Penchev 2007: 4).

Kant’s methodological merit, altogether, and – re-examining the assets of Kantian line of development – that of Heidegger’s as well, is in the step of substituting the abstract and entirely quantitative mathematical notion of time in physics with the concretizing and predominantly qualitative aspects of any of its possible transcendental or existentially-historical interpretations. It is, thus, the radical conducting of the phenomenological analysis (the type being of no difference) that makes it crystal clear, that **the comparison between the physical (resp. empirically-historical) and philosophical description of time from philosophical point of view is not correct at all, since it intrinsically presupposes lack of congruence of paradigms and concepts of time.** Contemporary postmodern philosophy, backs, for certain, on the qualitative definitions of time, which are existential and place particular emphasis on the constitutiveness, not on the scientific-positivistic descriptiveness. Time is a constituent of the intuition out towards a limit of the possible in general (which phenomenologists normally designate as “subject”, not a placeholder of something or a quantity). As for the positive science, it inquires only into the formal, quantitative aspect of time, bringing it into a substitute correlation with the dependencies of speed or movement within the possible (resp. empirical) experience. Such extensional definitions of time, though, always fall into a vicious hermeneutic circle – in the long run we remain in a tautological vagueness as to what time is like (because there is always something else implied), although, to all appearances we seem to “utilize” it in our practice. Time is an *effective* quantity, which does not automatically render it a quantity; it is rather, the mere horizon of being-comprehension<sup>18</sup>. **Time is not a property and it could not be an objective-metaphysical referent prior to the actual time of a descriptive ordering of the consistent wholeness of a given system** (which, for its part, even as a “universum” has no metaphysical privileges at all), i.e. it hasn’t got its own being independent of the experience and subjective predispositions in general<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> Here’s how Gilles Deleuze, on his part, frames up the constitutive part of time in relation to identity: “Throughout from one end until the other “the I” is as if being fractured: it becomes fractured with the pure and empty form of time. Assuming this form it correlates to the *coming into time of the passive “me”* (italics mine–I.L.). A fault or a fracture in “the I”, a passivity in me – that is what time means; and it is the correlation between the passive “me” and the fractured “I” that constitutes the discovery of the transcendental or the element of the Copernican revolution” (Deleuze 1999: 119). And still more: “The living present goes, therefore, from the past into the future, which builds up in the time, that is from the specific to the general, from the peculiarities, which enfolds in the shrinking, to the general, which unfurls in the field of its expectation (the distinction yielded in the spirit is the sheer comprehensiveness, inasmuch as it constitutes the living rule of the future). Such a synthesis should in all respects be termed a passive synthesis. Albeit constructing, it is not active. It is not made of the spirit; it is, rather, made *in* the spirit preceding every memory and reflection, which is the one to behold. Time is subjective, but this is the subjectivity of a passive subject. The passive synthesis, or shrinkage, is asymmetrical in its essence: it goes from the past towards the future into the present, ergo from the particular into the general and from there it shoots the arrow of time” (Ibid: 100).

<sup>18</sup> Considered from existential and phenomenological point of view, time is a relationship between a subject and object, with objects being not primary-designated “in time” – time occurs with the mere instance of bearing the burden of a given object – and beyond. “Sensed in this way – observes *Sergei Gerdjikov –time itself does not flow.* If time “flows”, it is, then, considered as an object set up through time. In that case time should be explained through a meta-time, which is a nonsense in itself. *The world flows.*” (Gerdjikov 2000: II, 49)

<sup>19</sup> Hypotheticalisation of every possible objectivisation and exteriorization lies in the naming of a reason consistent with a given paradigm of explanation, whose principles, however, continue to be open to dispute, or according to an invariably random criterion, which might proceed from states of routine frame of mind, or overexcitement, or some modern craze, or affection, or – just the opposite – aversion, etc. In this

The second fundamental point of the current critical analysis as regards metaphysics aspires to focus on Hegelian dialectic contributions to disclosing the idea of time. Available are immortal pages about the dialectics of spirit as well as about the becoming (*Werden* in German) of being into spirit corresponding to the succession of the moments in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (see **Hegel** 1969: 161-202). The main idea was, indeed, adopted by Heraclitus, yet with some beneficial additions made by Hegel in the sense of his phenomenology and dialectics. Time with Hegel, in spite of his philosophy being marked by substantialistic paradigm, is, still, defined phenomenologically, which is Hegel's own merit. The movement of thought with Hegel is movement "as time" – the very concept of time, thus, is phenomenological, since it turns out to be "chronologically solar" (see **Milchev** 2001: 201). And what merits is precisely the simple fact, that, as we could possibly figure it out, formulating his concept of time, Hegel, on no account, could have been acquainted with Einstein's "speed of light" as an objective benchmark, yet, what is more, "the solarization" with him – in view of the depth and peculiarity of his singular philosophical insight – is strongly disinclined to get estranged into material objects or physical constructs, or in other words into a property or benchmark. As for Hegel, providing a definition of time involves a special term – "doubling". In the sense of his phenomenology of spirit this term should be grasped as "simultaneousness", under which sublating through negation is at the same-time defining in simultaneousness of its positive content. "It is, also, AND the other" – the occurrence of time is conjunctive with the thetics in general – and it is this that constitutes the content of the dialectic as a type of logical form. Put it differently, following Hegel's phenomenology the Consciousness realizes, as self-consciousness, precisely that, which is no longer like a spirituality, not because the spirituality disunites with it completely, but because the spirituality itself makes it double (reflectively, phenomenologically) and grants its time as time of the consciousness<sup>20</sup>.

What is the actual essence of Hegel's methodological merit as regards time? Personally, I think, it resides in the following: **with him it is not the concept of time and space (as it is in the empirical science) that is given to the thing, the subject-matter of the concept is namely to concede "consciousness" to it, the one the spirit lends to it, so as to make its self-differentiation and development possible.** Since "the thing in itself" is indifferent to whatever possible development, feasible, in the long run, only in the reflection of the spirit... and only when the spirit allows itself *to be conferred* (through "struggle for recognition") via doubling and dialectic sublation of the moments... That is, with Hegel the phenomenologicity of the standpoint is, that **the consciousness itself is "self-awaring time" as a dialectic graduality of negation and sublation of that negation into a content, which are immanent in the reflection of the spirit.** Besides, to be further more methodologically clear I would like to highlight the following: Hegelian mental dialectic movement primarily is unaware of the conceptual defining (of the empirical natural and social sciences). On the contrary, characteristic feature of his, as I have already stated above, is the extensive use of

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respect the typical example of "the authentic correctness of the choice" is precisely the polemical philosophical (phenomenological) choice of comprehensible explanation of time, which takes time to be a constituent of the perceptual oneness of the being-in-the-world; a physicist, on the contrary, would examine time as a property, descriptively co-measurable with the movement of entities (via mathematical – fractional – dependables of distance and speed). In our case **time is a characteristic of the interpreting ability as regards the worldly occurrence and succession, the latter presupposing obligatorily dynamics of standpoint, resp. accounting for the conditionality of the interpretation, its principal disputability against other points of view and possibly completely different from my own type of experience.** Science, for example, operates with predominantly metaphysical (absolute) universum, whereas the universum of philosophy or art would possibly be discrete and interpretative.

<sup>20</sup> „Self-consciousness gets its satisfaction only in some other consciousness.” (**Hegel** 1969: 220)

*conjunctive* defining. In other words, viewed dialectically, the thing, which is concept-defining, has neither solid being, nor solid non-being, its being, however, manifests itself in dialectical synthesis – in the succession of antithesis (negation) and the synthesical “negation of negation”. The great philosopher, thus, showed his deep appreciation not only for the immanently uncharacteristic paradoxicalness of time, but he had also made the subsequent decisive step (following Kant) towards a pressing exculpation of the apprehension of time to the advantage of the subject and their faculties for development and change.

Yet, Hegel remained in the grip of an ontology of meaning<sup>21</sup> substantialistic in its essence. It is precisely this meta-physical incongruence<sup>22</sup> of thought from the sign, predetermining the foresight, meaning the body that seems inconsistent and even downright impossible with his ontological vision. Since it is *the body* (corpus) itself that is an organon of sense and it can be considered as nothing else but it being the exact opposite of thought. If you look upon it as “thought being its own self”, what is meant is again its body, which only from itself alone would disclose some meaningful content. It is, therefore, impossible to provide a definition of time not accounting for the body (corpus) as the very authentication of being<sup>23</sup>, and yet the body, nevertheless, is not to be foreseen metaphysically, substantialistically, but solely in an aporetic way<sup>24</sup>.

Coming across such a conceptual frame of reference, gradually but imperceptibly we get to the explications over the next salient task of this study – formulating a definition of time in as far as possible maximum sterile and free from any dogmatism terms. It is possible for such a definition to be existential, but it could, likewise, be also one of the possible definitions of the “existential time” in the proposed Berdyaev’s classification. A task of this kind is, undoubtedly, difficult, as long as articulation of a certain qualitative, that is precisely existential definition of time, is unable to stave off the risks of possible substitution of one thing for another, typical of all definitions in general<sup>25</sup>. Taken in this way a similar articulation only shows the way, it does not in any way disclose it.

Since it is exactly “the I” from a phenomenological standpoint that sets the form of every possible worldly concreteness, time, by no means, could be separated from the modulations and theoretical multiplications of the “I-ness”. “The I” is a body, that is capable of cultivating every single thing, although being incomplete in itself, it is no longer ready-shaped; to be a body, therefore, means *to have some time* among the facts to be the “I” whilst living in *The Other*. The exhibition of the body (that is their risk and vulnerability), spreading it out as a place is permitted above all by the space. Bodies are places, which dis-place out of themselves the event of the space. What then is the time as a second phenomenological constituent of experience? **Time, similar to the space<sup>26</sup>, is also a virtual event (of co-**

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<sup>21</sup> *Georges Bataille* stated somewhere in his diverse writings, that Hegel’s absolutisation of light (of thought) reached such an excessive extent, that life within its concreteness, incl. of the interweavings of death, has no right to have a night, to have a shadow, to possess EVEN a dark side. According to Bataille the fire of that light with Hegel, unfortunately, kept on melting away, again and again, Icarus’ wings, made of wax...

<sup>22</sup> In a rather paradoxical and even absurd way each theoretical metaphysics makes its best to overcome substantialistically the incongruence at issue for the benefit of one or the other party in counterposition.

<sup>23</sup> „Definiteness is an object of a certain activity, not the other way round.” (Vatsov 2003: 157). Seen from a radical and ontological perspective it is primary the body that is the doer.

<sup>24</sup> *The body-placing* and the *body-sense* are **the aporetic modes** of the body – with the former the body is corpus-presence, with the latter – only telos. Placing of the telos as a horizon of visibility out towards a given body is the beginning of every single philosophy (of the body).

<sup>25</sup> According to Heidegger and his “first philosophical step” as formulated by him in his work *Being and Time* it follows „not to tell a narrative, i.e. to define a given being as being by way of reduction to another being as if Being would have a character of a possible being” (Heidegger 2005: 13-4).

<sup>26</sup> On the whole, in a given virtual intuition spatiality there is no all-invincible space, all-absorbing space, irreducible to perceptiveness space – space, in general, to precede the spreading of the body. The space is the very assumption of the body (*Nancy*). Bodies “are the places of existence, and there is no existence without

**existence) of the experience**<sup>27</sup>; time is the other (*Levinas*), it has no place for the otherness, it, rather, goal-directs through the body<sup>28</sup>. It is not a measuring instrument, it, rather, co-measures the phenomenon out towards the subject and also in the suddenness of the denotation<sup>29</sup>. Time is the very own characteristics of the telos. Time is propagating of the possessions only then, when we have to approach them. “The contradiction, idealization “goal” assumes –observes farsightedly *Dimitar Vatsov*, – “is settled” *through the figure of time* (italics mine – I.L.). The distinction between immanent and transcendental is interpreted as a distinction between present and future. That, which is now impossible, will be feasible or will become possible in the future. The goal is idealization, presupposing, that overcoming the impossible, is possible.” (**Vatsov** 2003: 187)

Time, thus, turns out to be in the actual fundamentals of the attempt to withstand the consistently-self-identical horizon of *expedient* for “the I” interactive correlations. For example, **viewed completely transcendentially, reflection is self-viewing as regards time and in the risk of setting out from a privileged point of departure.** Through the most closely related to time – “the I” – it is the identity itself that is being designated. Brought to light in this designation is the paradox of naming: on the one hand time is the risk of identity facing the need of self-resistance. On the other hand it is the time itself that justifies the identity, in so far as it demands the movement/reflection as an “internal” pressure of its (that of the identity) external resistance.

Envisaged constitutively time is a characteristic feature of succession as long as every single instant obtained is current up-to-the-minute reiteration and re-confirmation of the status of “the I” (this body) as being also the *same* (itself) out towards the other. Identity, resp. *selfsameness means: always and ever the very same time after time, guaranteeing its preservation and perseverance.* In such a sense – facing up the complete otherness – time is a shadow of the idealization, that approves importance, significance and thenceforth – a habitus and reiteration as well. This selfsameness is set through the existentia and is existentially permeated all through. There is no selfsameness (resp. time) that eludes existentia – and in order not to augment avalanchingly at the expense of the existentia, the effect of multiplying essences, which is very beneficial to religion, science and daily view of life, it ought to be kept under control (look up the so-called. *Occam’s razor*). To say nothing of the fact that, the universal “essence in itself” is a displaced absolutisation of time and is already like a vicious closing of the horizon of deliberate penetration out towards the responsible agent (the existant) – precisely the one, who is cognizant enough to be in control! The selfsameness is always a conditional hypostasis – a single procedure is sufficient to attest, that “the same in time” is a retarding effect of designation – hence, by then, it is

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a place, without *here*, without a single “here is” for “this” (**Nancy** 2003: 30). “The point is that: the body is stretchiness. The body is exhibitiveness. Not only in the sense that, a certain body is being displayed, but rather that the body *consists in* that to be exhibited. The body means to be exposed to view.” (**Ibid**: 108) The body is exhibitiveness of the other (the logos). The meaning, touching upon its own touching, touches the body.

<sup>27</sup> “Time is, inasmuch as being *occurs* (italics-mine – I.L.).” (**Gadamer** 1994: 144) “Time is not at all a cast-out form of being, on the contrary it is *its very own event* (italics mine again).” (**Levinas** 1995: 87)

<sup>28</sup> It is the body itself that appears “in memory of time” because of its being *the intimate closeness*, requiring no time, since it is precisely **the one** that is *here, now* and it has never been away. It, thus, ob-serves the epoch as “here out of here” and “now out of now”. The epoch has gone away with the advent of the *other*, that is the body – the epoch, hence, has been noticed as a narrative-towards-...; that means, the epoch is no longer an epoch, but a narrative, something else. In the dense concreteness of the body, of its own narrative-as-a-body, the epoch is the odd one out. **The body prevails over time – and here lurks the biggest danger to the meaning.** The point is how to stay with itself –*isn’t its coming more of a departure?*...

<sup>29</sup> “No place is there either before birth, or after death. No before/after: time *is* extending. Time *is* the sudden appearance and disappearance, going/coming towards the presence: it is not the begetting, transmitting, perpetuating.” (**Nancy** 2003: 104)

already *up-to-the-minute other*<sup>30</sup> to its own articulation out towards the articulator; – **articulation not “in the same epoch” but responsibly revealing a horizon of epochality due to its being transcendental in itself.** Moreover it is exactly this “surpassing” transcendental act of violence towards the one designating themselves through their bodies (the subject) that brings-up-to-time in all manner of pre-destination – which is not the time itself but the mere chance of the designation! What is happening is all by accident – **the staunch tracing of necessities in the effects of the articulation – there is the beginning and enfolding of time.** Such genealogies by its very nature strips bare the appealing mystery of *the nude* precisely as a purpose (a goal), which in philosophy could be interpreted as: the mystery of every possible value of goal-directedness *out towards a body* of self-designating constituting<sup>31</sup>. If you gradually succeed by means of transcendental reflection and hermeneutics of your own self in attaining immanentisation of the idea of time, you will notice, that the body breaks off pertaining to the epochal predeterminations. On the contrary, its being a factor of spatio-temporal constitutive modulations out towards the skin and beyond, the latest ontological issue about it levels down the validity of every predetermined symbolic legendarity in congruence with the outlining circle of properties (telos). It is all dependent upon the breadth of vision of the respective viewpoint – it is the one to command the descriptive conditionalities and untimeliness of your standpoint. Disunitedness with your own self constitutively, i.e. falling into the assumptions of the universalism and metaphysics, will, beyond doubt, make you solve some quasiproblems, incl. that of the omniscience of time, as well as that of the insurmountability of the tug out toward the world history.

It should always be taken into consideration, that time as a mere notion and myth is laid out and experienced entirely in the horizon of the very essence and goal-directedness, although in effect there is no goal-directedness, resp. time in the absence of efficient subject-object designation<sup>32</sup>. It is not the time that understands, in the long run, however, it itself is the one to be understood, although such an understanding requires rather knotty reflective and dialectic procedures. It is not the time that provides the answer, incl. even in the plan of history, rather – the existant does it! And there is no pre-eternity of the understanding, but eternally up-to-date creatively gaining an understanding of the being through the existentia. **Time is a benchmark of the manifestation of the existentia, but it itself does not bring it up to time, it is fundamentally conceptualisationable as eidos** (in Heideggerian discourse – *existential*) – as “temporality”. **Temporality<sup>33</sup> does not develop from time, vice versa, time comes out of temporality, when assumed is responsibility for narrative line of story.** “Pure time” with no reference to temporality is approximated only when, following the effects of content conceptualization (that is sinking into them) we allow ourselves to

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<sup>30</sup> In fact “up-to-the-minute other” including the *time itself* as a fatum and concept.

<sup>31</sup> Such is, probably, the allusion of the irrefutable fact, that “by birth” our body is “imposed upon” and in a manner of pre-destination is ever and always craved after precisely as *stark-naked*.

<sup>32</sup> The question “What is that?”, incl. of “what is time like?” within the framework of what is being articulated – and with respect to “who?” of the current articulator – is not only *invalid*, it is **impossible** – thus we touch upon the aporia of the articulation. That, which pertains to what has been articulated, is simply words, that follow formally – by necessity, and by substance – **in possibility**, a certain “puzzle of words”. What is currently articulated is prior to any place and time; it lodges **in the articulation itself** the places and moments of being-the-same. The world is the result of deliberate **current** articulation here-and-now. Setting aside this conditional first mode of carrying-the-world-within, we embark on (through the puzzle) the effects of our own quest and pursuit of something more pragmatic – “in space and time” of randomly set explanatory matrix. This is how, in fact, every science proves to be possible as well as every single explanation of privileged places/singular objects “in time”, including “the time itself”.

<sup>33</sup> According to Heidegger “temporality times up, and at that, possible ways of its own self. They, on their turn, make the wide variety of the way-of-life modes of Dasein, primarily – the basic possibility of the authentic and inauthentic existentia” (Heidegger 2005: 252, §65). “Temporality is the fundamental “Outside-of-itself” on its own and for its own sake.” (Ibid) “...Its essence is timing up in the unity of ecstasies.” (Ibid)

forget how temporality could time up to such an extent so as to ignore *temporality* altogether for the benefit of the objective physical time. This is just what, according to Heidegger, is called *lagging behind* and *getting completely lost* in the plan of the existing – when time starts to seem as if it is the one, that pulls us along, not our will-power/agreement to render it its due<sup>34</sup>.

The issue about the status of the existential time is an issue not so much about the value of experiencing a time with an exceptional quality not commonly encountered and universally adopted; it is rather an issue of the quality of the experience itself. In such a case the question at issue acts directly, as highlighted above, not so much upon the ontology of time, as that of the body, since the course of reduction does not coincide with the arrow of time (legalizing the imperialism of the identities and reiterations), quite the contrary, it tries to discontinue the effects of lagging behind in the depths of the possible experience. If we are to bring up the issue of valuableness, then, quite obviously, we should also raise the issue of the right methodology that would employ more beneficial to the subject paradigm, contributing to the fulfilment of the ultimate goals as pure as possible, with no unnecessary intermediations of the means (deviating objectness and multiplication of entities). **It is precisely this lostness within the labyrinth of means that drifts away the pure goals<sup>35</sup> in time – the outcome of all this is, that time never suffices for the most significant, the pure existential goals continue to be too far away and impossible to attain...** Such a course of development evolves from the inertia of telling one and the same story, of reproducing the worldliness for the benefit of the objectivation, incl. the omniscience of the objective time, to distance the existence away from its own existential focal point. To stay invariably with your own self, making those present complying with the existential centre at issue, means to be existentially responsible for the wisest choice. The responsibility viewed existentially-phenomenologically is comes along with the encounter with your own self (the body) as the first other. You are chiefly hold accountable to somebody else and with an unambiguous clarity, that the other is not fundamentally predetermined in themselves. Responsibility, thus, appears to be the very baselessness of your having yourself as your own self, and yet gaining such a baselessness is not an event from the range of time, on the contrary, it is an event, that deliberately holds up the course of time. Time pertains to the range of well-preserved and forever eternalized fundamental self-sameness, whereas responsibility is not primarily of the range of the reply<sup>36</sup> (although derivatively it is precisely that), since it originally requires clarity for every single happenstance and circumstantiality of recognition. **The responsible existence is base-less, not on-the-basis.** Therefore the choice of a paradigm for studying time should express the existentia itself, in a way that allows its integrity and its responsible choice not to get self-estranged in time, just the opposite – to discontinue its adverse effects, ripping apart the one-essence of the personal

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<sup>34</sup> Neither we can create the arrow of time, nor it is it that begets us; time is available only in our agreement to recognize the importance and exceptionality of the pattern of events of a certain narrative, whose ontic presence philosophically-genuinely is disputed in the act of this disputation (i.e. phenomenologically-reducibly terminates at the point/object, out towards which it has started).

<sup>35</sup> In the transcendental reflection, in case it is radicalisationally executed thoroughly, the theoretical and practical plan coincide, with the vicious incongruence between the two plans being dealt with – precisely as an outcome of all the procedures of critiquing the possible experience and the fully conscious avoidance of going astray amidst the lagging behind (in time) effects of language designations, remaining (currently!) overlooked as such. Forced out on the whole, should be all ambiguities and whatsoever numerologies as well – the unity of the world is not preconditioned out of the intuition – and it is precisely this that knocks to pieces the ideas of whatsoever technologies (in their capacity as “panaceas” for deliverance) and the struggle for “the right means” towards the aim. **The aim is in the assumed event of the worldly-constituting-of-oneness – with the aim itself being not a time-burden of world, but – the subjectness of the insight oneness, the telos.**

<sup>36</sup> The latter requires a dogmatic cathehesis, which is to mean – need of observing a content pattern, what legalizes the absolute rights of the time.

monad (individuation) to myriads of “essential” fragments-of-the-world. This is what the human enchainment in the depths of the space and time is like according to Berdyaev – the existential assembling is methodologically impossible with the lack of clarity as to the “essential” incomprehensibility of the sign about our own selves, and consequently – also about the minor constitutive value of whatever type of explanation, ascertaining the “adverse” effects of the multitudes and infinity. The event of all-articulation of the world by the existents is not an event in time. All empirical events, including the time itself, registering private facts and circumstances, are mere effects (shimmerings) following in content the all-articulation of the world – as aforementioned – out towards a certain limit of the possible. The art of reflection is to bring us time after time to such an *untimeliness* (and even beyond-temporality) of what is being experienced. The antidote against being absorbed in the annals of time (the possible experience) is awakeness-to-be-come capability of reflective comeback from “my own self” – to “me”, that is a capability of obtaining *de novo* the event of the body with every single turn, bringing to a halt the draught and the absolute value of the discourse as a logos. Coming across the aporia of the body is now not a possible experience, but an actual one. The actual experience is ever and always out of time and here resides its beneficialness as a methodological strategy of not-lagging behind in the annals of time. Within the reflexive context of phenomenological ontology – and when the meanings become highly controversial as regards precisely the primary unfathomableness of signs (the true groundedness in the so-called paradoxes of the presence), all of a sudden the articulations stop passing on their essential meanings. It is exactly in such an experience of the sheer otherness (where the transcendental reduction has been carried out to such an extent as to be held in check, reaching impossibility) **the need of articulations comes to be less and less intense, forcing, therefore, the time of world-disclosure to shrink until it vanishes behind the point of actual non-stretchiness.** All that has been stated so far and in such a way, represents a kind of a syntagma, a metaphore, figurative expression of something, which the conscious synthesis reprocesses up to the point as to re-launch it more readily as a “folklore” interpretation, with an absolute clarity about the effects of the paradoxicality (not that of the heavy science controversy, we are prone to expect).

It is not surprising, therefore, that for N. Berdyaev “the end of the history is not a historical event. The end of time is not an event within the range of time. The end of the world would come about not in the future, which is a fragment of our fractured time. **The end of the world is the end of time** (the bold is mine – I.L.). There shall be no time any more. The time is a sign of the Fall of the world. The end of the world is winning a victory over the cosmic and historical time, over the objectivated time; it would pass through into the existential time. And this end is always near; we are in the grip of its horror” (Berdyaev 1993). Here I would like to add my own ontologising concretization about the issue of conclusion of time: to stop the time means indeed to win a victory over the Fall, the act itself, as I have already stated, is the capability with sufficient phenomenological boldness to reverse the direction, where the adverse effects of the possible experience unfold, to stop bearing irresponsibly the burden of the world, lacking the clarity to perceive that temporality is a virtual idea (*eidos*), which effects out of our own free will and with our permission, not like some juggernaut tug of destiny and our predetermination by the “objective time”. In such a context **time stops only when (incl. the intermediate procedure of the phenomenological “epochè”) the consequences of the non-uniformity of the narrative (history) are existentially observed and taken upon, coming to a halt at the ontological impenetrability of the body, which tells (articulates the history)**<sup>37</sup>. The awakened

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<sup>37</sup> The reality behind the historical narrative is not “within Time”, it is, rather, in the articulation of the person who does the telling. It is precisely in the content telos of the narrative itself (which is constitutive to the

experience of the event of the body outweighs the time – it is exactly this that presents the principal danger to the meaning<sup>38</sup>. Being always “with the body”, the goal-directed-ness<sup>39</sup> at the first-encountered other (the body) is the very manifestation of an essential impenetrability – since it is the body itself as the first constitutive post<sup>40</sup>, that represents the very manifestation of the pure goal. The paradox is precisely in the fact that, consciously targeting the body, we secure ourselves as a goal-upon-our own-selves; if we had taken no notice of the body as being the first-encountered other, attaining “my own self ” as a goal would have turned out to be impossible because of the self-estrangement of one’s own self in the adverse estrangement effects of a certain false identity out of the world-of-the bodies, which would have empowered the time to reign over our pre-destin-ation (Last Judge-ment). The one and only possible final judgement over time, is within the fore-doom of goal-directed-ness of the actual Doomsday (Day of Judgement), we have at our disposal, in fact an altogether Mysterious placeholder (of doom) – the body. Therefore the Doomsday is not an event within time, on the contrary, it is the eschatological end of time, being also, at the same time, ontological one, disclosing the body as the first and the final immediate manifestation.

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Let us consider the following again: the existential time is a choice – to choose yourself as a *goal*. Thus my existential choice naturally re-confirms itself, hopefully, in the attained goal of the message behind the paper put forward. I do not mean that the existential time “is superior” to any other time, or that my paradigmatical choice is fundamentally something more than any one else. I have already explained in details the reasons of making it my interpretative choice as regards Being – since it preserves the maximum concreteness (resp. the sterile cleanliness, the anti-dogmatism) of the allotted as to the subjectness of the presence and does not multiply unnecessary the entities more than is necessary (makes no concessions to the dogmatic empeiria in preserving the purity and sterility of the transcendental intuitiveness). Division of time is in a conditional narrative – its aim being to make the approaches distinct and to choose the more incisive approach for the one, who dares to penetrate. This approach, however, should not be adopted as a disciplinary obligatory one. The experience of time for the subject is not an event within the time of the world. Seen in this way, the value of the paradigm, having unveiled the temporality, results from the self-worthiness of the existentia, not from the triumph attained in a certain world competition between concepts. In the long run the synchronization of the diverse beliefs, the synchrony with others, is not only obligatory, but even impossible. Approximated, at all times, is only close congruence – we are never within one and the same plan. Diachrony and its consideration is not just a type of dialectic complementariness as to the other, it is above all a kind of respect to its own existential self-distinctiveness, which is the only one capable of securing responsibility and thoroughness in the use of knowledge and communication.

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narration, not descriptive as to certain events, surpassing the event of articulation) where we could discover some historical identity of our own selves and some historical destiny of ours.

<sup>38</sup> See note 25.

<sup>39</sup> The task of a given existential being is assumed out towards a maximum concrete subject, primarily-designated methodically, encountering the body as a primary-intervening-space – and I (the subject) instant-by-instant am the agent of the enwholing and creative *goal-directedness*. In this way and in tune with it the subject in question does not belong to the world, he rather penetrates it from the outside and does that at once. The knowledge, thus, (inventing every possible picture of experience) is in unison with the very carrying-the-world-within (initiating into the very world-under-projection).

<sup>40</sup> “Post” here conveys the meaning of *and* every possible post-scriptum, what scriptums are like purely and simply.

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# ВЪРХУ ЕКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛНО-ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧНАТА ИДЕЯ ЗА ВРЕМЕ

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## Резюме

Статията представя интересен авторов ракурс спрямо генеалогичните корени на идеята за времето. Знае се, че принципно философията на постмодерна следва да изключва времето като метафизичен фактор за предопределяне концепцията за времето и различните дефиниции за време. Акцентът в тази статия е да визири времето „едно-временно“ феноменологично и екзистенциално, което на първо място означава феноменът „време“ да се погледне съобразно подстъпите на една радикализираща философска редукция, разкриваща *несвоевременността* на всяко питане за време изобщо. Това предполага самото разбулване на феномена тепърва да разкрие хоризонт на епохалност, а не имплицитно да подразбира времето като фактор за закономерно случване на биващите в хоризонта на някаква си епоха или традиция. Един такъв подход, макар и да съдържа в себе си генеалогичен анализ, е принципно противоположен на всяка преднамерена аналитичност, която би могла да даде на времето емпиричните права, които изначално не му се полагат, освен едва в постфактума на рефлексията. Именно такава е основната теза, прокарана от автора в представения за печат материал: че няма никакво време изобщо извън контекстовото конституиране на свят в хоризонта на „времовост“, която – в качеството си на екзистенциал – овременява съд-бовно едва в назованата възможност да бъдат означавани съществуващи. Това прави времето преди всичко „поетото бремя“ на отговорността да назоваваш и повтарящо да обвързваш представата за биващото със значимостта/важността на назоваванията. Визираната теза, както и доказателствата, които я обезпечават, са изведени тематично постъпателно и логично коректно.

**Ключови думи:** време, трансцендентализъм, феноменология, епохе, конституция, екзистенция, екзистенциал (по Хайдегер), епохалност, времовост.