NATURE AND MEANING OF REPETITION IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

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Repetition is a basic figure of every verbal communication. Representing in most cases intentional and manipulative reiterations of words, phrases, sayings or text passages, repetitions are irrevocable means of expression of a given public speech and discursive interchange. Repetitions make sense in the activities of men in their capacity of invaluable building blocks of social experience re-asserting every single truth or convention. The repetition of what is significant, makes it generally known to the community and decodes it in the eye of all social actors, in short – socializes it. The role of repetitions is to synchronize with the others the continuance of personal manifestation and to provide the necessary ‘time-durability’ of the communicativeness, namely transforming it into a socially legitimate linguistic interactivity, in the long run – into a communication of full social value.

The aim of this study is to disclose the significance of the repetition as an expressive figure and method of linguistic and social practice, highlighting the real and clearly distinctive features and varieties of reiteration, including the limits of political discourse.

The task of the issue focuses on the following three points:

– Bringing forth the validity of the overall philosophical value of repetition as a paralinguistic figure of discursiveness in general;
– Revealing the varieties and functionalisms of repetition, including the political speech and politological language;
– Presenting conclusive reasons and arguments about the value of the politological discourse as regards the use of written repetitions in the politological texts.

СЪЩНОСТ И ЗНАЧЕНИЕ НА ПОВТОРЕНИЕТО В ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЯ ДИСКУРС

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(резюме)

Повторението е основна фигура на вербалната комуникация. Повторенията, представлявайки в повечето случаи съзнателни и манипулативни повторяния на думи, изрази или цели сенкеници и текстови пасажи, са неотменими изразни средства на речевата продукция и дискурсивния обмен. Повторенията имат смисъл в човешката дейност в качеството си на неотменими елементи, изграждащи опита и преутвърждаващи истините и конвенциите. Повтарянето на значимото го прави достояние на общността, разкодира го пред очите на всички социални актори, накратко казано – социализира го. Ролята на повторенията е да синхронизира с другите полето на личностна изява и да осигурява на комуникативността нужната й „трайност във времето”, именно превръщайки я в социално легитимна езикова интерaktivност – в пълноценна комуникация.
Целта на тази разработка е да разкрие важността на повторението като експресивна фигура и метод на лингвистичната и социалната практика, подчертавайки неговите дефинитивни и фактически особености и разновидности, вкл. и в границите на политическия дискурс.

Задачите на изложението се концентрират в следните три насоки:

– Изтъкване общофилософската валидност на повторението като паралингвистична фигура на дискурсивността изобщо;
– Разкриване на разновидностите и функционализмите на повторенията, вкл. и в границите на политическата реч и политологичния език;
– Презентация на доводи и аргументи за ценността на политологичния дискурс с оглед на употребата на писмени повторения в текстовете на политологична тематика.

Ключови термини: повторение, итерация, различие, симулакрум, символ, знак, цитат, клише, щампа, устно говорене, политическа реч, политологичен език, писано слово, препис, запис, политически дискурс, политологичен текст.

1. Philosophical significance of repetition as a discursive figure in general

The repetitiveness is based upon the separateness in time of acts which repeat themselves. The one develops into the same but the same although being the same of the one, has already developed (in the course of time) into something else, acting on its own. At the same time, the one carries this transition in itself, it is precisely the one that finds itself into the same and through this, it is brought forward into presence again. Thus, the same, although being another act, returns
to the *one*, reasserts it as exactly the same one and thus denies itself as something *else*.

The significance of one-and-the-same-thing\(^1\), of its dialecticality, is reduced to this spontaneously appearing but reasonably disappearing otherness of the next act. The one-and-the-same-thing is something possible of being discerned and settled; it could be reflected within its own processuality (notwithstanding all the obstructions to this) as well as out-of (before or after) it. The one-and-the-same-thing is very easy to describe (being a repetitive cultural form – the natural and bio cycles are not simply fictions, rather they are perceived as real processes), while the one (as one) and the same (as same) are beyond description. “The One cannot do without the Other” – upholds the French philosopher *Emmanuel Levinas*\(^2\); reaffirmation of the being of that which is set apart is possible only by means of a figure that fixes the same as possibly being away from the other. Such a peculiar figure that grants the being of the same *from within* the other is precisely the repetition.

The philosophical re-interpretation of the Modernity in a postmodern spectre of perception has disclosed *the ontological*, in Jacques Derrida’s own words – “hypertextual roots”, of repetition. It has crossed the borderline of the classical linguistics, of the conventional theories about language and text in the scope of semantics and semiologies, in order to become a basic explanatory figure of the transcendental-virtualistic critique of the language and different types of hermeneutics of the sign.

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\(^1\) According to Boycho Boychev “only man does one-and-the same. The animal (and the machine) does only one and only the same – in its activity the apparently unnecessary connecting “and” is missing. The animal (and the machine) does one, because it remains in the one-timeness of the act, unable to step outside its limits. For it the act is not unique, due to the impossibility of being registered, settled and reflected” [Boychev, 2003: 100]

\(^2\) See Levinas, 2000: 14
According to another French philosopher – Gilles Deleuze\(^3\) – the so-called “modern world” is a world of the simulacra. The man in it does not outlive the God, the identity of the subject does not outlive that of the substance. All the identities are simply simulated, brought forth as an optical „effect“\(^4\) out of a deeper interplay between the difference and repetition. We want to consider the difference entirely within itself and the correlation between the different and the different, irrespective of the forms of the notion, which reduce them to the Same and carry them across the negative. For people with a regular frame of mind, this is, by all means, extremely difficult to grasp, since the ordinary and even positive scientific way of thinking is non-reflective. In the simulacrum the repetition already refers to repetitions, whereas the difference – to differences. To put it aphoristically: repetitions repeat themselves, and what is different differentiates itself. Repetition is a differentiative accentuation of that which has to be identical to the “same” through the sign of what is primordially another, which principally cannot be the same. Repetition, therefore, appears to be a difference, but a difference with absolutely no concept whatsoever and in this sense in-different difference. That which repeats itself not purely formally, but in the very content of the expression, is the only one that is, deliberately repeated as the “same”. In brief – repetition is symbolic in its essence, with the symbol, the simulacrum, as stated by Deleuze, being “the letter of the very repetition”. The difference is included in the repetition through the predetermination and the order

\(^3\) See Deleuze, 1999

\(^4\) “The words slice up time as the way glances split up the space – marks the philosopher Atanas Igov. The necessity of the Viewer to view and the Speaker to speak is the drug of the impossibility of the full presence, of the necessary absence. (...) The Voice that cannot speak forth all by itself and that begins-to-speak, unable to speak upon its silence, is the Desire to speak forth the unspeakable “here”. This Desire is the drug of the language. At the basis of these two lies a presence-with-insufficiency, the existence, intended for the wholeness, which it always fails to achieve, but to which it is irrevocably doomed. To capture the full presence means to satisfy this Desire to the full.” – Igov, 2001
of the symbol. Accordingly, the paradox of repetition lies in the possibility of speaking about repetition only through the difference or the change it initiates in the spirit viewing it, that is through a difference, which the spirit draws from the repetition. Intrinsic in the functioning of the simulacrum in its capacity as “a letter of repetition” is the simulation of what is identical, similar and negative. There would be no idea of a world, capable of reproducing itself as the “same”, resp. known and ready to be used, if through the figure of repetition simulated were not (as effects of verbalization) the precise three categories mentioned above, multiplying the quantities.

Interesting attempts to provide a philosophical explanation of repetition were made in Plato and Friedrich Nietzsche’s works. Plato, in one of his dialogues, introduced the character of the Sophist as a simulacrum of the terribly deceitful, extremely unfair protagonist – in fact, the typical anti-protagonist. With Nietzsche, in contradiction to the Socrates-Plato line of philosophy, we are about to see somewhat intensive (non-quantitative) manifestation of repetitions in the cyclic recurrence of manifestations in general – the so-called “eternal return”. The interpretations of Nietzsche’s concept of the “eternal return” (not being developed, by now, as a complete philosophical idea of full value), are different and contradictory. There are authors (e.g. Kurt Vonnegut), who dared even in their works to parody Nietzsche for his point of view. According to the downright radicalistic interpretations (e.g. those of G. Deleuze and Felix Guattari) “that, which is or is returning, has no definitive or constructed identity whatsoever, irrespective of its inherence in the order of what is being verbalized: the entity is reduced to its crucifying difference and to all implicit-in-itself differences, it passes through. Viewed precisely and in this sense only, as we have already
pointed out, the simulacrum is the very symbol, which is the sign, as long as it exteriorizes the conditions of its own repetition. The simulacrum has grasped the constructing non-uniformity within the entity, dethroning it from the rank of a model. That’s why for Nietzsche the subject of the eternal return is not the same, rather it is the different, not the similar, but the dissimilar, not the Unit, but the multitude, not the necessity, but the accident.

Thus, according to Deleuze, the repetition is to be understood as a condition of action, prior to being a concept of reflexion. We produce something new, if and only if, we reproduce it first in line with the modus, constructing the past, and secondly at the very present moment of the transformation. And what is produced, what is absolutely novel, in its turn, is nothing but a repetition – the third repetition, this time because of an excess – of the forthcoming as an eternal return. If we allow ourselves a role “personification” of the moduses of time, then in such case, the present is that which repeats, the past is the very repetition, and the future is that which is being repeated.

So far, we have studied the repetition in its role as an ontological ingredient. Repetition does not simply repeats what is known, its difficulty of being seen as a figure of ontology lies in the fact that it forces through metaphysical idealizations the symbolic form to recognize the known as such over and over again. Viewed in this way, its role is first of an eidos, and after that of a textual emphasis. “The ideality” of the eidos under discussion, according

5 Compare with the ingenious metaphor (“Legend of Echo and Narcissus”) from At. Igov’s text mentioned earlier: “The re-sponse of the Mirror is the Echo herself – the matrix of the Word, which has to be spoken-to, to be called-upon from the outside, by the Voice of the Face, by the very vibrancy of her silence. That Voice, which rips off the silence, which infects it with a Desire to re-spond, which lays a curse upon it with its gift – to be an echo of the Voice of her Desire, to await the Voice of the Other. A Voice which bestows her with the Word as a dream of Eros, as a gift of Morpheus.”

6 According to Nietzsche (see The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music), reinterpreted incl. by Deleuze, “The art does not imitate, but first and foremost, precisely because it repeats, repeats all the repetitions in the name of an inner power (the imitation is a copy, whereas the art is a simulacrum, it turns the copies into simulacra)” [Deleuze, 1999: 366]
to J. Derrida\(^7\), “is the very form, in which the presence of a single object in general can be endlessly repeated as the same. (...) Ideality\(^8\) is the salvation or the supremacy of the presence in the reiteration. In its purity that presence is not a presence of something that exists in the world; it is in a correlation with it through the precise ideal acts of reiteration”. To put it simply: **there is no presence outside the repetition**, the presence is always already overtaken by a (present) speech act, and we have no guarantees of a single presence whatsoever, resp. of no possible order, which is to be present outside the speech act.

From here drawn could be the following radical conclusions, cutting through, like a red thread, Derrida’s method of deconstruction: “To talk to somebody means undoubtedly to hear myself speaking, to be heard by myself, but also and at the same time – if I am heard by the other – to do so, that they to repeat immediately in themselves my-own-hearing-of-myself-speaking in the same form, in which I have done it. To repeat it immediately, i.e. to reproduce the pure self-affection with the help of no exteriority.” From this truly radical position “the voice is the being in itself in the form of the universality, as a consciousness. The voice *is* the consciousness” and there is no “consciousness in general” without a verbalisation in the speech hyperact, nor “fellowman consciousness” regardless of the supposed possibility in the act of utterance for such a consciousness “to be real”, “to exist”. **The discourse represents itself continually, it *is* its own representation; there is no initially presented, exemplary, model discourse**, but only “extension of representations”. Moreover, the discourse is its own self-representation. For Derrida “there has never been a perception, and ‘the presentation’ is representation of the representation, which is here presented as its birth and death.”

\(^7\) See his book *The Voice and the Phenomenon – Derrida*, 1996

\(^8\) According to Derrida “the absolute ideality is the correlate of the opportunity for infinite repetition” [Derrida, 1996: 73].
In the long run, in order for the deconstruction of metaphysics to be complete as regards the repetition as an act, ontologem and eidos, not only the classical opposition “subject vs. object” should be overcome (something, that even Martin Heidegger does to a great extent), but also the opposition “the signifier vs. the signified” (Ferdinand de Saussure). It is precisely the repetitive assumption that outside language there exists something available in itself, identical in itself signified, which reasserts the solidity (adequateness) of the metaphysical propositions. Another similar metaphysical assumption is: availability of identical in itself denotation of the signifier. These identities in themselves (availabilities) should be freed from their deception and that is why J. Derrida re-interprets at a language level (more precisely, at the level of writing) Heidegger’s concept of non-self-identity of what-is-at-hand, of the thing. Engaged by Heidegger in the interpreting projection of the existence (ek-sistence), the thing or that-which-is-at-hand does not exist as identical in themselves objects, rather, they are always “for something” – offer opportunities for something, intend something beyond themselves, “predict” something, they are an instrument, a mediator, a means for something else (as media they are always “a middle point”, not an end point, the essence of the action).

2. Repetitions – varieties and functionalisms within the scope of the political speech and the language of politology

The embeddedness of the repetition in the very beingness with a methodological persistence indicates that as a figure of speech and linguistic communication it is of paramount importance both for the politics and politology.

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9 See details in: Vatsov, 1998
10 See his fundamental research work Writing and Difference.
The nature of the political reality is constantly gaining strength and reasserting itself through the use of repetitions in the political speaking. Let’s not forget that every communication situation has political roots, being an expression of an intersubjective state and sharing of consensuses and all forms of social agreement. Moreover, communication, making use of repetitions comes from power and aims at power. The distinction between the philosophical and politological level of rationalization of repetition as a figure of communication is, all the same, distinctly transparent: viewed philosophically, repetition acts the order in the very worldliness, pro-nouncing the being as happening in a spatial exteriority and temporal succession in general. The more concretised political level, in its turn, does not grasp all the repetitions in the light-bringing plan of activities, but only as activities in re-affirming the worthiness and usefulness of a given specifying discourse with preconditioned and unquestionable exteriority and temporal tenseness – that of politics. Here the reflective level of understanding is ignored for the sake of the pragmatic one. The self-interest in the use of repetitions steadily strengthens a specific way of perception and understanding of reality, whose aim is to experience the world around us in accordance with the political ordinance (which are inherent in repeating) and the game consistent with the rules of politics, or to put it otherwise – in the direction of expectations for rational predictiveness of the behaviour of the political players and guaranteed sustainability of political vectors, roles and processes.

The levels and forms of repetitions in political discourse are varied. The standard form of repetition, especially in the political speech, is the so-called iteration – according to J. Derrida this term should be understood as “literal repetition”. In political discourse iteration and interpretation are in opposition and yet they mutually complement each other – as B. Boychev states, in principle
“there is no such a discourse, striving toward a permanent return in its original literal sense, or such a discourse, that always yields noval and unique meanings with not a single one being repeated”\(^\text{11}\). The same author puts forward an interesting distinction in the functionality of the iteration and the citation, which brilliantly differentiates between all the similarities, distinctions and their intended meanings. Both the iteration and the citation may be actually defined as literal repetitions, with some subtle shades of meaning. It is common for political speech to make use of iterations, moreover repetitions through iterations sound more like ideological slogans and mantras. In its turn the language of politology places a bet more often on the quotation, deliberately pursuing a culturally dominated authority and more hermetically tight legitimacy. The distinctions between iteration and the quotation in these cases refer to the following: (1) their existence – iteration remains independent, whereas the quotation is contextually bound, (the quotation usually employs a predominantly scientific authority); (2) their literalness – in iteration there is no predominance of the literal sense, whereas in the quotation the meaning is likely to vary depending upon its place and relations to the other elements of sense in the text being quoted; (3) the external signs – in iteration the identity borders on uniformity, in the quotation – on dissimilarity; (4) degree of abstractness in generalisations – iteration is concrete in its form, abstract in its content, the quotation (in a politological text) though being more often abstract in form, makes the content concrete, and because of this – strongly problematises it.

It is necessary to point out that there is a distinction between the terms “citation” and “quotation”. According to B. Boychev in citation (a term, favoured by Russian textlinguists) there exists an extraction from the speech of the interlocutor, whereas in quotation – insertion into the text of fragments of other

texts. It is, therefore, quite reasonable to refer extraction, resp. citation, to more common practices of political speech, whose legitimacy in most instances does not strive for excessive scientificalness or creative effect and uses the authority of the leader or the doctrine directly and literally. Conversely, quotation through insertion is typical of politological language and is commonly found in the written texts of scientists-politologists. In such a context, in fact, it stands to reason why in the verbal forms of the political discourse used are mostly elements of the standard repetition system – phrases, remarks, sentences, emphases, interjections, being indispensable for the habitual and comprehensible flow of the discourse. Viewed in this way, the iterative repetition in the regular political speech (incl. of the dialogue between interlocutors) is a communicative means of reducing the tempo of the dialogue, thus, gaining more time for thinking over the remarks of the interlocutor and considering all the possible answers to these remarks. On the contrary, in a politological text the role of repetitions in their methodical varieties is not reduced to the standard (usually distracting or riveting the interlocutor’s attention) level, rather, they touch upon a higher, in Derrida’s words – “culturological” level, demanding successful completion of the political reality through carrying out novel, contributory moments out towards the suggested meanings.

Generalizing upon the comparative study plan of iteration and citation, we ought to point out: 1) The use of iteration is based upon the intention to achieve a wider general validity of the political inculcation; 2) Citation, in its turn, finds it difficult to keep the quote in the new context, it invariably carries it back to the original one, thus the speech or the text always turns out to be politically doctrinated; 3) “The normal” quote, more typical of the politological texts (with more manifested cultural load) assumes individuality at every new moment, and in this sense it is more subject-engaging and less doctrinal. Therefore, iteration
and citation are prior to the quotation, resp. the spoken (verbal) political speech is considerably different from the political and mainly politological text.

Specific forms of repetitions in political discourse are the cliché and the catch-phrase. These two forms (the catch-phrase being a derivative of the cliché) are also widely used in the media political language. The cliché is a ready formula of speech, frequently used in certain, recurrent speech situations. The catch-phrase is that cliché, which in the course of time and with regard to the frequency of its use has become devoid of sense, deriving no cognitive synthesis for the recipient of information.

Through the use of clichés demonstrated is usually social empathy and belonging to a widely accepted, mass consensus from the part of the speaker. The cliché can also be a sign of agreement, or quite the contrary – of disagreement. **Cliché speech is convenient for political inculcations, especially when the latter have mass, bonding character.** Clichés thrive well, especially when used in a “street” slang and in the so-called informal youth groups. The cliché is inseparable part of the language of mass media. Clichés make this language widely comprehensible, strengthen the specificity of all messages, “call in” their audience, accustomed to such type of reiterative language and reasonably respond.

The catch-phrases are usually part of the realm of the political slogan, of the proverbs and moral sayings. They do not enrich the content of the speech, rather they impart a peculiar legitimate hue, strange halo of conventionality and accessibility. Basic functional spheres of the speech catch-phrases are administrative, news-paper journalistic and political. **It is dangerous for the language of catch-phrases to increase exponentially in publicism and political discourse.** Nowadays this is a sign of backwardness and chalgalization of publicist genre and politics. Yet, the catch-phrase, when used with no limits and in
the wrong places, turns into a parasite of the speech and impede the message, depriving it of a more elegant and pretentious audience.

Typical catch-phrases e.g. in today’s discourse of foreign policy are concepts, gradually stripping themselves of their content through their uncontrollable overrepetition, and also through non-conformity with the changing realities: “international community”, “euro integration”, “market economy”, “liberal democracy”, “western values”, “civilization choice”, “human rights” and etc.

3. Distinctive features of written repetitions. The importance of the politological discourse as regards the use of written repetitions

In the written text the deployment of repetitions makes the impression that it grows there with quite a difficulty. This fact is somewhat an illusion, yet, all in all it opens up a field for a debate on the advantages of written over spoken words. There are solid arguments in favour of the statement, that the written text repeats nothing else but itself, since nothing from the text, or from the procedure of its “production”, matches anything else in nature. Text writing is more or less a unique event, and the uniqueness in question, though even on a lower level, is preserved even when the text is simply transcript of the original, that is, a specific written form of repetition. Writing of an original text is a unique act – few are initiated into this art, requiring special personal capabilities. Every text and every writing that are not transcription and copying, are in their essence original and unique.

Nevertheless, writing, even when it is original, comprises in itself the elements of the structure of repetition as a basic means in linguistic communication. No one starts writing out of a sudden, ad libitum. Besides, in
every writing perceptible is the moment of imitation. Writing is seen as a mimesis of reality, which is being described. The contemporary deconstructive paradigm (Derrida) towards metaphysics and the conventional apperception denies the secondary, that is the mimetic, “awaiting” view of writing as a “description”. It sees the world itself as a re-echoing effect of writing and the differences, caused by the traces, leaving the signs in their “open opportunity” for multimeasurable interpretation of their meanings. However, even from such a point of view repetition exists as a rhythm of the beat – and in a constant redirecting of the meanings between the other-sameness of the dialectic (alternating) reiteration of signs and meanings with no referent.

The production of the graphic output is the record. In all cases, the record is assigned to hold the repetition of already existing speech production. The record immanently hides within itself the multiplication effect of repetitions.

The man is the one that writes the texts. Thus he becomes a real co-author of the reality, re-creating it in writing, in a text, through the standards of the sign, yet in agreement with their impression and beliefs about it. The very text becomes a fact of the reality and corrects it according to the measure of the human presence in it. Even what is repeated in a given unique written text is the signs, morphemes, syntax, and punctuation. The “repeatedness” in question induces empathy with a given narrative, which constructs the universal community, the epoch, the history, the culture. “The written remains” – said the ancients earlier in times, implying, that only the written text guarantees for the tradition to outlive the vicissitudes of time and the oblivion associated with it.

It is necessary to differentiate between “the person who writes” (writer) and “the person who keeps the records” (clerk). This should predetermine the solo worth of writing. Every writer is also a clerk, but not every clerk is a writer. The process toward ingenuity of both the expression and the message in writing is
the creation of the writing author, endowed with a talent and aptitude in writing of a text, handing down an innovative idea.

The philosopher Plato puts forward a singular “critique of writing”, primarily influenced by the ranks and authority of his teacher Socrates. The latter is renowned with his dialogues, which are an original antique triumph of the verbal philosophical persuasion and provocative *irony* through various figurative methods of speech. Among Plato’s arguments as to the drawbacks of writing we can list the following: 1) Writing makes the memory weak, binding it to “external to it” points of support in the text; 2) The written texts are not addressed to personally specified reader (there is no primary instruction for comprehension); 3) The wisdom, the works of writing reveal, is not alive, rather, it is feigned, mediated; 4) The static character of the written word is contrary to the dynamics of the living speech dialogue; 5) The authoritativeness and competence of the written slips away, because their author is not visible as a real personator in the dialogue.

There are strong reasons in favour of the superiority of the spoken over the written speech\(^\text{12}\). Meanwhile, some authors, and among them B. Boychev, hold a strong belief that, “...Plato’s critique is not an appeal for refusal of writing, but a clear unmarking of the life-affirming dialogical philosophizing from the far more impotent in this plan written speech“\(^\text{13}\). It is true, that writing to a certain extent makes the space of communication anonymous, hiding the face of the author, belittling their responsibility. The horizon of the written text makes the field of communication easily acceptable, multiplies the amount of the participants and the possibility of different points of view. Furtively hidden in all this are both beneficial and hazardous moments.

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\(^{12}\) See their gradual enumeration by B. Boychev on pp. 117-8 of his book.  
\(^{13}\) *Ibid.*: 118
Communication today is predominantly mass, precisely because of writing. Mass communication virtualises the space, strengthens the relativity of the positions. At the same time, however, the role of those who write in this sea of anonymity even among the authors themselves, remains as strictly individualistic as ever. The writing itself is an activity of the individual, who pretends to be a personality and a complete subject in the process of communication. Writing is something like a “categorical imperative” (Kant) of the linguistic expressiveness. In no other way could the interlocutor gain a kind of “universal legislation” in narrativization, but through writing. When the writer writes the thing he wants to say, they do not move out of the feeling, that in fact they tell that to everybody, to “every single individual of the entire human community” as a fully potential participant in the dialogue responsible for the taking of the meaning of the message.

Writing is a kind of “moving away beyond the visibilities” (B. Boychev). Writing is silence and the falling-into-silence of the writer leaves the impression of a certain secretiveness and symbolic representation of that what the author was willing to say from within “the secret recess” of their withheld piece of writing. Writing is not other than speaking, rather it is, in B. Boychev’s words, “another speaking”. It is interruption of the trivial speaking, it is also a recording of somebody's speaking, but at the same time it can be a project or a model of the state of the things or of the world. Man speaks above all as a generic being, but writes as an individual one. Here, we also need to disclose the essence of the difference between the political speech (which is mostly verbal) and the politological text, whose aspirations are more strictly cultural and scientific. The outrageous literalism and standardized repetitions with no due limits accepted in the trivial political discourse are dialectically removed from the scientific specifications, the thoroughness and research determination of the politological
text, which is predominantly set down in writing or – in case of being spoken – place the standards of the written text as its own limits. In politological texts the writer assumes much greater responsibility than the speaker, since they are trying to put in a certain meaning, critical attitude and problematicity. **Repetitions in politological texts do not aim for trivialization, they try to restrict the field of “mass consumption” of the text, and in this way exactly they enhance the value and significance of the text message.** Although being less public as an activity, the writing of politological texts produce a more lasting effect of going – public, than the simple political messages in the everyday speech activity. Additionally, the reading of politological texts frequently sparks in the reader empathy with what is written, as well as sharing of the responsibility for what is written, as far as that, what the author has stated as “having to be accomplished” is about to happen, to incarnate, precisely in the expected level of publicity, i.e. exactly where a given individual political idea could be taken over and converted into a “public consensus”, into the widest possible social sharing.

Forms of the politological written text can be the *transcript* and *translation*. A great number of transcripts are “new issues”, involving the author’s editions of already existing texts, which appear to be somewhat obscure or incomplete. An illustration of this is for example *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* by Karl Marx, which represents in a concise, yet intelligible form the main ideas, developed in the rather analytical text of the first volume of “The Capital”. A similar clarifying text of what seemed to be one and the same are also *Prolegomena* by Immanuel Kant, rendering what is declared to be the idea of the principal work “Critique of Pure Reason” more accessible and less sophisticated. In essence, the written language of politology is not more complicated and difficult for understanding than that of political economy or philosophy. That’s why, similar editions of politological texts are comparatively
more infrequent, however likely to happen. As far as the translation is concerned, it is a transcript, realized however in a foreign language. **What is necessary here despite the literal word-for-word translation in a given foreign language, and the concretizing clarification of the specificity of the meanings of some strictly theoretical terms, in line with the “international” language of the science of “politology”** – depending both upon their primary scientifically-conventional meaning, and at the same time according to the context of their usage in the current chapter of the book (dissertation). Therefore, similar politotological translations involve not only the translator, who is usually a qualified philologist in the respective language, but also the consultative participation of an expert (politologist), having knowledge both of the source language and the scientific terminology, which is used in every concrete case.

In view of what has just been said, the following conclusion might be drawn: the nature of the methods, used through repetitions in the written speech, creates completely different type of communication possibilities. Thus, authors and complete subjects of the written communication become both the person who writes and the person who reads. **The value of the politological written text within the limits of political discourse lies in the fact, that the criteriology as to the creation and perception of such type of texts requires much higher level of competence, creative co-participation and individual responsibility.**

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